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ABSTRACT 
For critical systems, timely recognition of an anomalous condition immediately starts the 
evaluation process.  For complex systems, isolating the fault to a component or subsystem results 
in corrective action sooner so that undesired consequences may be minimized.  There are many 
unique anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities available with innovative techniques to 
quickly discover an issue and identify the underlying problems.   
 
This research develops a framework to aid in the selection of appropriate anomaly detection and 
fault isolation technology to augment a given system.  To optimize this process, the framework 
employs a model based systems engineering approach.  Specifically, a SysML model is 
generated that enables a system-level evaluation of alternative detection and isolation techniques, 
and subsequently identifies the preferable application(s) from these technologies 
 
A case study is conducted on a cryogenic liquid hydrogen system that was used to fuel the Space 
Shuttles at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida (and will be used to fuel the next generation Space 
Launch System rocket).  This system is operated remotely and supports time-critical and highly 
hazardous operations making it a good candidate to augment with this technology.  As the 
process depicted by the framework down-selects to potential applications for consideration, these 
too are tested in their ability to achieve required goals.      
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
Space operation missions are of a critical nature.  This is due to the large expense associated with 
such missions, many of which have interrelated costs approaching, or exceeding, billions of 
dollars.  In addition, space exploration missions often have small windows with limited chances 
to recover from issues that may occur, and complete the mission successfully.  Once committed 
to a given phase during these missions, opportunities for do-overs are rare.  Adding to this 
criticality is that space operation systems require highly hazardous commodities to propel, power 
and operate the various systems.  This adds a safety factor both for those participating in crewed 
missions as well as those involved in ground processing of the launch vehicle and spacecraft. 
 
These spacecraft are comprised of numerous complex systems.  This includes the equipment that 
makeup the spacecraft used for delivery, and the various payloads and science instruments used 
to meet the research objectives.  Accompanying this complexity will be the assorted 
complications.  As individual components do not always operate as projected, some failures are 
to be expected.  This is further compounded as the system’s complexity increases.  With payload 
costs just recently starting to approach $1000 per pound (a tenth of that experienced by the space 
shuttle) (SpaceX, 2011), designers must still strike a balance between system redundancy, sensor 
allocation and hardware weight.  An absence of redundancy minimizes the options an operator 
has should a failure occur.  A lack of instrumentation limits visibility into system performance.   
 
For many systems, timely recognition of an anomalous situation means the issue gets evaluated 
and a course of action is decided on quickly.  Taking corrective action sooner can help minimize 
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damage generated from off-nominal conditions, or avoid serious outcomes for those problems 
that can escalate rapidly.  The ability to quickly detect and identify anomalies that arise is vital 
for critical space operations.   
Anomaly Detection 
One of the earlier definitions of ‘anomaly’ is that it is an observation that appears to deviate 
markedly from other members of the sample in which it occurs (Grubbs, 1969).  More recent 
definitions conclude that anomalies (or outliers) are patterns in the data that do not conform to a 
well-defined notion of normal behavior (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009).  Anomaly 
detection is a recurring term found within the academic literature and has been applied to a 
variety of fields.  One of these fields, and the one applicable to this topic, includes health 
management of complex systems.  For this research project, anomaly detection will be referred 
to as the ability to uncover abnormalities that arise.  This term is more comprehensive than ‘fault 
detection’ (also common in the literature) as it also includes anomalies generated by 
environmental influences or operational circumstances.   
 
In many cases, space operation systems are predisposed to take advantage of anomaly detection 
applications.  This not only applies to actual space missions that rely on autonomous designs, but 
also includes supporting ground systems.   Do to the hazardous nature of testing and launch 
support environments, many of the ground systems are operated remotely.  As processes 
operating via remote command and control (C&C) rely on (limited) sensor information, anomaly 
3 
 
detection capabilities can supplement the flow of useful information to the operators based on 
various techniques used to evaluate the sensor data. 
 
Anomaly detection routinely involves one or more people to monitor the system measurements.  
The primary method of anomaly detection is to bind the sensor data to predetermined limit 
exceptions.  If an excursion from these limits occurs, an operator is alerted who then assesses the 
significance of the exception.  This method is reliant on an operator with sufficient domain 
knowledge to take appropriate action, and subsequently, a large number of experts may be 
employed for complex systems.  Operators too can monitor the data real-time or during post-
operation analysis.  However, with limited display space, it is impractical to have visibility for 
every remote sensor in a complex system.  This is further hindered in that an operator can only 
focus on a smaller subset of displayed data.  Therefore, the operator relies heavily on the 
automated monitoring of the entire sensor array.  This reliance means an operator could benefit 
considerably from an enhanced anomaly detection capability.   
 
The predominant method for developing an anomaly detection system is to select one or more 
applications that may fit one's needs.  The selection process may be limited to what is readily 
available, and a scrub against the system requirements may end up diminished.  After these 
modules are selected, development then starts on a system-level architecture that can integrate 
the various elements into the current design.  As this is a niche application, a certain amount of 
tailoring will be required to render the forthcoming architecture functional.  An application that 
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is not a good fit can amass excessive development hours in an effort to make the system 
operational.  
Fault Isolation 
Detecting an anomaly is the first half of providing the operator with the vital data necessary to 
develop a course of action.  After an anomaly has been detected, the other half of the process 
(and equally important) is to isolate the fault within the system.  Isolation to a component or 
subassembly provides the domain experts with the essential information necessary to respond 
and possibly remedy the situation.  Fault isolation will optimally be able to point to a specific 
source.  However, a lack of sensor information often leads to uncertainty which can result in an 
inadequate diagnosis.  It is often the case that the initial data related to the anomaly is not 
sufficient to pinpoint the original problem, and involve additional troubleshooting to find the 
cause.  This may result in an initial isolation of the problem to an upper subsystem level.  In this 
limited-visibility scenario, it would not be unusual to have multiple suspect subassemblies and/or 
components identified. 
 
In addition to issues related to limited sensor data, system complexity can make the fault 
isolation process arduous.  The task of isolating to a fault entails assessing all possible 
contributors to the problem, each with varying degrees of sensor coverage.  For a complex 
system, these contributors can number into the hundreds and possibly thousands.  A fault that 
yields additional damage compounds the problem as one must differentiate if that damage is 
collateral to a single fault or originating from an entirely different fault source. 
5 
 
Problem Statement 
There are many types of anomaly detection and fault isolation techniques described within the 
academic literature.  Some of these applications are specific to a given system or to a type of 
problem, while others cover a wider spectrum of cases in general context.  In addition, they have 
varying degrees of effectiveness.  Complex systems may require several anomaly detectors and 
fault isolators to provide an adequate discovery capability.  These diverse applications may target 
different areas of a system, or may focus on a specific concern and work independently to 
provide consensus that an anomaly is occurring or the fault source has been determined.    
 
Although a multitude of anomaly detection and fault isolation programs can be found in the 
research literature, there does not appear to be any work published on architectural templates that 
could take advantage of multiple programs and integrate them into the desired systems.  More 
specifically, there is an absence of a methodological process for generating anomaly detection 
and fault isolation designs to either embed within new system concepts, or supplement existing 
schemes. 
Research Objectives 
An architectural framework template is being considered that assists with anomaly detection and 
fault isolation module selection.  Such a framework would consider the user requirements and 
then be able to model the proposed system.  This will enhance the module selection process and 
thereby optimizing the detection/isolation suite.  Such a model will assist the developers when it 
comes time to implement the system.  The primary objectives of this research include: 
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• Develop an architectural framework template using system engineering principles 
that standardizes how users can model a system augmented with detection/isolation 
capabilities   
• Based on architectural analysis, provide a methodology that can determine an 
optimal suite of detectors and isolators that best meet the user requirements. 
• Generate a model that can integrate the detector components into the system and 
provide a basis to directly produce design implementation documentation 
• Verify and validate the model by experimentation using actual space operation 
systems data 
Research Contributions 
The importance of anomaly detection and fault isolation is already valued by those operating 
complex and critical systems.  This is consistent with the amount of work devoted to 
development of these methods and the abundance of techniques that currently exist.  Many of 
these detectors and isolators are developed for specific applications with a very narrow field of 
focus.   
 
The primary contribution of this research effort is realizing a conceptual model that assists users 
in generating anomaly detection and fault isolation schema.  This research should extend the 
contributions of those development efforts by providing a means to organize the 
detectors/isolators for ingestion into the model, and subsequently, acceptance for use should the 
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capabilities meet the desired requirements (or rejection of the detector/isolator should they not).  
The secondary contributions should then include: 
• Couple anomaly detectors and/or fault isolators with unique applications for 
which they were never intended, but could benefit from the underlying detection/isolation 
techniques  
• Improve accuracy in anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities by pairing 
those deemed optimal for the given environment in which they will operate 
Dissertation Organization 
This chapter provides an introduction to the anomaly detection/fault isolation topic, and how this 
research effort will focus on developing an architectural framework for inclusion of these 
technologies for space operation systems. 
 
Chapter 2 will survey the academic literature for relevant anomaly detection and fault isolation 
technologies.  This review will also encompass system engineering techniques that may support 
development of an architectural framework.  A gap analysis is then performed to determine 
where a need might exist to extend the prevailing level of research. 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the methodologies and procedures used to conduct the research effort.  
This includes an outline of the research design for the proposed framework, rationale of the 
methodologies used, type and source of the information needed and analysis of the data gathered.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on developing the proposed framework.  This consists of examination of the 
detection/isolation techniques and a means to organize these applications by variables that 
support the architectural design.  System engineering practices will provide the foundation for 
model development.      
 
Chapter 5 will present a space-operations related case study that showcases an implementation of 
the proposed framework.   
 
Chapter 6 centers on the analysis of the case study.  This chapter will also validate the model 
being generated.   
 
Chapter 7 will summarize the research results, provide concluding remarks, and offer 
recommendations for future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Purpose 
To formulate a conceptual architecture addressing anomaly detection and fault isolation, a 
comprehensive literature review was conducted.  The rationale for conducting the review was 
twofold.  First, a thorough review aids in bounding the research problem and directing the path 
forward.  This is accomplished by identifying the existing work, and from that, recognizing 
which areas within the field of study that can benefit from additional inquiry.  These ‘gaps’ 
enable the narrowing of the designated field to either a new study domain or one that extends 
existing research, thus avoiding duplicate efforts that have already taken place.  A gap analysis 
will further assist with differentiating those areas that could benefit from additional study. 
 
The second reason is that a literature review expands insight into the chosen topic.  A review is 
necessary to assess the related prevailing concepts.  More specifically, the review includes 
discovering the various detection/isolation methodologies already developed and understanding 
the variables that make up the different technologies.  Insight is also gained by identifying 
relationships among the applications and realizing different perspectives for implementing within 
diverse systems.  
 
One objective of the review was to identify the current scope of anomaly detection and fault 
isolation applications.  This includes existing technology that may already be in use, conceptual 
designs not yet implemented or paired with a system, or any related emerging technologies.  The 
other review objective was to attain relevant system engineering methodologies that could be 
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used to build an architectural framework that forms a standard model to support future 
implementation.  This chapter surveys the relevant academic literature related to these topics and 
provides a baseline from which advancement by new research can be appraised.  
Anomaly Detectors 
Numerous models are available in both model-based and data-driven classes.  The algorithms 
involved tend to be ‘specialists’ in that they are most effective for selective failure modes and/or 
component types.  Anomaly detection is typically accomplished by a rule or signal-based 
method.  However, data-driven models have found a niche for possible better performance in 
complex, dynamical systems, an important factor for critical systems.   
Data-Driven Models 
One area of anomaly detection that is getting considerable attention involves a data-driven 
approach.  This involves developing a knowledgebase of data depicting normal behavior which 
becomes a baseline set for comparison.  Abnormal behavior is then described as incidents were 
the data behavior diverges from the baseline.  Data-driven models tend to disregard the physics 
behind the data and instead focus on the differences behind the dataset standard and test case 
data.  Hence, an advantage of data-driven models is that the developers do not require domain 
knowledge of the system under study nor do they need to model the system specifics.  Such a 
design allows for distribution across multiple system platforms with little (if any) modification.  
In addition, the requisite system knowledge is captured in the training datasets.  These datasets 
can also be expanded as nominal operational data is collected (D. Iverson et al., 2012).  
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Developing the model will require some system subject matter expert (SME) input to identify 
related subsystem sensor data.  The SME can also characterize the sensors based on criticality.  
This information can be used to adjust sensitivity levels and establishing threshold values.  This 
data-driven method appears to be a simple approach, but does have its challenges as stated below 
by (Chandola et al., 2009): 
• Defining a normal region that encompasses every possible normal behavior is 
very difficult. In addition, the boundary between normal and anomalous behavior is often 
not precise. Thus an anomalous observation that lies close to the boundary can actually 
be normal, and vice versa. 
• In many domains normal behavior keeps evolving and a current notion of normal 
behavior might not be sufficiently representative in the future. 
• The exact notion of an anomaly is different for different application domains. For 
example, in the medical domain a small deviation from normal (e.g., fluctuations in body 
temperature) might be an anomaly, while similar deviation in the stock market domain 
(e.g., fluctuations in the value of a stock) might be considered as normal. Thus applying a 
technique developed in one domain to another, is not straightforward. 
• Availability of labeled data for training/validation of models used by anomaly 
detection techniques is usually a major issue. 
• Often the data contains noise that tends to be similar to the actual anomalies and 
hence is difficult to distinguish and remove. (p. 15:3) 
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For data driven models, the baseline dataset is often referred to as the ‘training’ data.  The 
training data itself has different classifications based on what is known about this dataset.  A 
supervised dataset is one that combines known anomalies with known normal data.  Such a 
dataset is considered labeled accordingly (anomaly and normal).  A semi-supervised dataset 
contains only normal data and an unsupervised data set does not have any labels (Omar, Ngadi, 
& Jebur, 2013).  In many cases, obtaining labeled datasets is not at all practical for complex 
systems.  For anomaly sets, this requires simulating the anomalies to a resolution that closely 
mimics real-world.  Fabricating anomalies such that the issue is fully propagated throughout the 
system can be both a difficult and comprehensive task.  The alternative to simulation is actually 
experiencing the anomaly numerous times.  This (of course) is not the optimal approach to 
developing a training dataset and would only be practical if a hardware failure could be 
simulated without system collateral damage.   
Models/Algorithms 
There is an assortment of algorithms that have been developed and applied to many complex 
system applications.  Due to the longevity of the Space Shuttle program, its unique need for 
anomaly detection capabilities, complexity, and NASA’s inherent goal to support scientific 
research, it has been the subject of numerous studies and testing related to algorithm 
development.  The simplest type of anomaly is classified as a ‘point anomaly.’  This is “an 
instance of the data that has been found to be anomalous with respect to the rest of the data” 
(Gogoi, Bhattacharyya, Borah, & Kalita, 2011).  As this includes the data found with sensor 
arrays under study, the anomaly detection methods will only address this type of anomaly.  In a 
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majority of applications, this is the type of anomaly occurs most often, and a good amount of 
research addresses this issue.  The following list summarizes the various point-type anomaly 
detection methodologies as described by (Chandola et al., 2009).  
• Classification 
o Neural Networks 
o Bayesian Networks 
o Support Vector Machines 
o Rule-Based 
• Nearest Neighbor 
o Kth  Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) 
o Relative Density 
• Clustering 
• Statistical 
o Parametric Techniques 
 Gaussian Model 
 Regression Model 
 Mixture of Parametric Distributions 
o Non-Parametric Techniques 
 Histograms 
 Kernal Function 
• Information Theoretic 
• Spectral 
14 
 
 
All of these techniques will be given consideration for inclusion in the anomaly detection 
architecture.  Using the classifications from the list above, the following sections will review 
some of the anomaly detection research that has already been applied to space operation systems. 
Rule Based 
The primary method currently used for anomaly detection is an exception notification 
methodology which could be considered a derivation of a rule-based practice.  Although 
Chandola et al describe this method as requiring a rule-learning algorithm, due to both the 
criticality and reliance of this methodology, the rules are predesigned and embedded within the 
controlling application.   
 
The rules are quite simple.  Each analog parameter is given an upper and/or lower exception 
limit value that encompasses the nominal range (also called signal-based).  The exception limit 
for a discrete variable is the opposite of its current state.  If an exception to these limits occur, the 
operator is alerted.  Exception limits can be generated to protect either the design or operational 
limits of the system.  As the operational environment changes, limit settings can be widened or 
inhibited so as not to alert on nominal transient responses, and then reset to the newly desired 
limits for that phase of the operation.  Note that transient operations often create ‘blind-spots’ 
while monitoring the system as anomaly detection works best with stable processes.  For 
hazardous, time-critical or hardware-concern issues, exception limits are often used as trigger-
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points to initiate additional rules (i.e. turning off a failed sensor or switching from a primary to a 
secondary system).     
Nearest Neighbor 
The nearest neighbor approach is based on an assumption that related data tends to group in 
dense neighborhoods.  Anomalies are those outliers that are found some distance away from the 
closest neighbor (Chandola et al., 2009).   
 
An anomaly detection method called Orca (Bay & Schwabacher, 2003) uses a nearest neighbor 
based algorithm to determine outliers. To minimize the computational time, it employs a pruning 
technique which allows it to perform in near linear time. Orca calculates a weighted average of 
the Euclidian distance for the numerical values and a Hanning distance for the discrete variables. 
The output from Orca is a distance score which represents the average distance to its k-nearest 
neighbors.  The further away the nearest neighbors, the more anomalous the data correlating to a 
higher score.  Orca has been used to detect anomalies in the Space Shuttle main engines (SSME) 
during both flight and engine test-stand runs  (Abdul-Aziz, Woike, Oza, Matthews, & lekki, 
2011) (M. Schwabacher, Oza, & Matthews, 2009). 
Clustering Algorithms 
In a clustering-based approach to outlier detection, the “key assumption made is that large and 
dense clusters have normal data.  The data which do not belong to any cluster or small clusters 
(low dense clusters) are considered outliers” (Murugavel & Punithavalli, 2011). 
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A data-driven application called Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) is a distance-based 
anomaly detection tool that uses a clustering technique.  The data structure used for distance-
based analysis is a vector of concurrent values from related system parameters.  IMS reads real-
time (or archived) data and formats it into a vector structure.  It then searches the knowledgebase 
of nominal data (training data) and returns the distance between real-time and the nearest 
nominal data vectors (Matthews, Srivastava, Iverson, Beil, & Lane, 2011) (Martin, Schwabacher, 
& Matthews, 2010).  When the real-time data is consistent with nominal, this difference is close 
to zero.  If the data vectors start to diverge, an increase in the vector differences is noted and the 
real-time data is then deemed ‘out-of-family.’  This can be an indication of an anomaly that is 
occurring. 
 
It should be noted that the real-time data is being compared to previous collected empirical data.  
Thus, an out-of-family indication can also reflect a normal condition that was not fully 
characterized within the nominal data sets used to ‘train’ the model.  The IMS application works 
well with unsupervised data which is likely the only type of data available for most large 
complex systems.  Unsupervised means there is an assumption of normalcy, but a potential exists 
that undetected anomalies are embedded within such data sets.  In these cases, IMS could treat 
some anomaly precursors as nominal, requiring even greater vector disparity before getting 
flagged as anomalous.    
 
17 
 
IMS has been used for anomaly detection testing in the Space Shuttle (wings, main engines) and 
ground launch systems.  In addition, it is currently used to monitor Space Station subsystems 
(Matthews et al., 2011).  Reference Figure 1 - Anomaly Detection Process Flow Example for a 
process flow example using a data-driven distance-based anomaly detection model.  
 
Figure 1 - Anomaly Detection Process Flow Example 
 
Neural Network 
A neural network is trained on a nominal reference data set to learn the different normal classes.  
Each test occurrence is then submitted as an input to the neural network.  If accepted, the test 
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instance is deemed normal, and if rejected, anomalous (De Stefano, Sansone, & Vento, 2000) 
(Chandola et al., 2009). 
 
NASA started the Methane Thruster Test-Bed Project (MTTP) as a platform for research of 
plume diagnostics and Integrated System Health Management ISHM. A method to validate the 
sensors was developed using an auto-associative neural network (AANN).  Archived data was 
used to train and test the (AANN) for sensor validation. Sensor faults ranging from hard (loss of 
power or over powered which would drive the sensor off-scale low or high) to soft (indication 
drifts from actual) were artificially injected.  The AANN was able to detect the faults from 
within the pressure sensor data as well as predict the values of the pressure measurement to a 
reasonable degree (Russell, Lecakes, Mandayam, & Jensen, 2011). 
Statistical/Parametric 
A regression analysis for anomaly detection requires that the individual data be fitted to the 
regression model.  The focus is then on the residuals as these represent data that the regression 
model could not explain.  The anomaly score is an accumulation of divergence values of the 
residuals from the model.    
 
A Beacon-based Exception Analysis for Multi-missions (BEAM) tool was developed by the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to monitor autonomous space systems.  This application was then 
modified to support the monitoring of the Space Shuttle main engines during both flight (real-
time) and post-flight analysis (or post-test for ground testing).  The anomaly detection module 
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for this application is called Dynamical Invariant Anomaly Detector (DIAD).  The DIAD 
element performs a parametric estimate of the residuals based on a single quantitative 
measurement.  It is believed that the ‘dynamical invariants’ are less sensitive to operational 
influences and impacted more by internal changes to the system dynamics (Park et al., 2002). 
 
A method of generating an adaptive anomaly detection threshold using interval models has been 
proposed by (Puig, Quevedo, Escobet, Nejjari, & de las Heras, 2008).  This concept was adapted 
to monitor a propellant ground controlled linear-actuated valve used for rocket engine testing at 
the Stennis Space Center (SSC).  Nominal data was obtained from both the performance and 
simulated operations of the valve under study.  A number of autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA) models are generated so that the valve’s behavior is satisfactorily represented based on 
the control data (this can be a trial-and-error process) (Russell et al., 2011).  The valve’s control 
pressure was adjusted such that the valve could not close completely, thus simulating an 
obstruction which is subsequently detected as a fault by the model.  It should be noted that 
applying this method of simulation, manipulating control parameters to achieve a desired result, 
negates the use of those control outputs for the nominal data set (often, these outputs are 
monitored to determine valve performance).      
One-Class Support Vector Machines 
Support vector machines (SVM) map the input vector into a higher-dimensional feature space 
and then separates the nominal data from anomalous in that feature space (one-class refers to the 
possibility that only normal data is available).  A separating hyper-plane is determined by 
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support vectors (a subset of the training data) rather than the whole training samples and thus is 
extremely robust to outliers. The training and test cases are represented using a kernel function 
that returns the distances between pairs of examples.  The anomaly score reported is the distance 
from the test data point to the hyper-plane as measured in feature space.  One-class SVMs have 
been used to detect anomalies in the SSMEs during both flight and engine test-stand runs 
(Abdul-Aziz et al., 2011) (Omar et al., 2013) (M. Schwabacher et al., 2009). 
Fault Isolators 
With an overabundant number of potential fault sources for a given anomaly, it would be ideal to 
have a model that can automate the fault isolation process.  This provides the capability to 
ascertain each of the possible failure scenarios, and utilize the entire sensor array to evaluate 
each case.  In those instances when multiple fault sources or subsystems are identified, the model 
can rank the potential candidates and present them in order of those deemed ‘most-likely.’  For 
time and safety critical circumstances, the initial system-safe actions can be automated to trigger 
based on the type of fault identified. To accomplish this, the fault isolation algorithm must 
recognize the failure type, locate the failure position and detecting the extent of the failure (Wu, 
2005). 
 
Data-driven detection models are indifferent to the physics behind the sensor data as they devote 
their attention to abnormalities found within the data.  However, fault isolation models require 
system knowledge to accurately pinpoint the source of the fault.  There are cases where data 
observation alone will be able to identify the faulty component.  For instance, an analog sensor 
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with a nominal indication (approximately midscale) goes off-scale low or high in a single sample 
step (an electronically high sample rate is assumed).  Typically, such a rate of change would be a 
physical impossibility for that system.  Therefore, a model could accurately conclude the sensor 
itself has failed.  Conversely, if the sensor indication just starts drifting away from nominal, the 
challenge is then determining if the sensor is reporting system dynamics accurately, or if in fact, 
the sensor is failed.  Note that a sensor is also just one component in a command and control 
system that leads back to an operator.  This requires additional corroborating data combined with 
system knowledge (for both Process and C&C systems).  This highlights that the fault source 
may occur at any point from the C&C work station to the remote system being operated 
(reference Figure 2 - Potential System Fault Sources).  A supervised data-driven model has the 
capability to accomplish this task, but this requires a bank of anomaly classified datasets (a 
method of archiving system knowledge).  As stated earlier in this paper, deriving anomaly 
classification datasets is likely an impractical option for complex systems. 
 
Figure 2 - Potential System Fault Sources 
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Fault Isolation Models 
 The following is a review of fault isolation research that is being applied to space operation 
systems.  The emphasis is on work that supports large-scale complex systems (vs. isolation at the 
component level or smaller subsystems).  All of these techniques will be given consideration for 
inclusion in the fault isolation portion of the proposed architecture. 
Physics Model 
Physics-based modeling that accurately represents the system can be adapted to perform fault 
isolation duties.  A physics model captures the system knowledge within mathematical formulas 
that define the system.  Therefore, such a model will ‘understand’ the system dynamics to 
include areas not covered by instrumentation, an advantage that overcomes limited sensor 
deployment.  A physics model can be used to simulate a given system, and failures can be 
injected and subsequent outcomes recorded.  The expectation is the model will fully propagate 
the issue throughout the system.  This methodology can be used to develop anomaly cases that 
could support both detection and isolation.  For unknown problems, one can alter the parameters 
of a high-resolution model to match suspect failures until an outcome comparable to the issue 
experienced is obtained.  Physics models are complex and may not be deemed practical for a 
fault isolation application alone.  However, these models have become the norm for assisting 
with the design of new complex systems.  This means much of the computational effort may 
already be accomplished and available for modification and integration into a fault isolation 
environment. 
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NASA is developing a physics based model to simulate the launch pad’s liquid hydrogen 
propellant ground system.  They modify the nominal-run model by simulating faults.  The sensor 
data is collected and archived for use in fault diagnosis applications (Osipov et al., 2011).  A 
modeled-based diagnostic approach to the system is accomplished using a combined qualitative-
quantitative methodology approach per (Mosterman & Biswas, 1999).  As the measured values 
diverged from predicted values, these are compared to qualitative predictions made using the 
system model for fault isolation.  Fault identification is performed using particle filters for joint 
state-parameter estimation (Daigle, Foygel, & Smelyanskiy, 2011). 
 
Expert Systems 
As expert systems are intended to mimic human-reasoning (the predominant method employed to 
identify fault sources), they have been widely used for fault isolation applications.  Expert systems 
are developed using rules based on empirical associations.  Fault diagnosis is a hierarchical process 
carried out in a step-by-step manner with the next step dependent on the results from the previous 
one (Kodavade, 2012).  An expert will reason via a set of rules that leads to a logical chain of 
events.  A fault is detected if a violation of these rules occurs (Marzat, Piet-Lahanier, Damongeot, 
& Walter, 2012).  Table 1 - Expert System Techniques for Fault Detection/Diagnosis (Angeli, 
2010) provides a summary of the pros/cons to the different types of expert systems. 
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Table 1 - Expert System Techniques for Fault Detection/Diagnosis (Angeli, 2010) 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Rule based diagnostic expert systems 
Rules can be added or removed easily Lack of generality 
Explanation of the reasoning process Poor handling of novel situations 
Induction and Deduction process is easy Inability to represent time-varying and spatially 
varying phenomena 
A process model  is not required Inability to learn from their errors 
Efficiency and effectiveness in  fault detection Difficulties in acquiring knowledge from experts 
reliably 
Development and maintenance is costly 
Model based diagnostic expert systems 
Device independent diagnosis Domain dependent 
Knowledge acquisition is not needed Difficulties in isolation of faults 
Ability of diagnosing incipient faults Knowledgebases very demanding 
Deal with unexpected cases 
Flexibility in the cases of design changes 
Dynamic fault detection 
On-line diagnostic expert systems 
Real time fault diagnosis Domain dependent 
Ability to handle noise Good models are required 
Generalization Require considerable data 
Fast computation Inability to explain the reasoning process 
Ability to handle with dynamics Computationally expensive 
 
 
NASA has developed a rule-based expert system called Spacecraft Health Inference Engine 
(SHINE) to perform system health diagnostic functions.  SHINE uses heuristics to quickly 
isolate possible fault causes and causal-reasoning to analyze the fault and further refine possible 
causes (Straub, 2011).  This system has been used for ground testing of the ARES 1X rocket (M. 
A. Schwabacher et al., 2010a) and the Tactical Satellite-3 (TacSat-3) spacecraft (Mackey, 
Brownston, Castle, & Sweet, 2010). 
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Functional Fault Model  
A functional fault model (FFM) is a term being applied to an application that maps out the 
system in a way that links the inputs/outputs down to specific components.  A commercial 
product being used in several space operation systems is called TEAMS (“Qualtech Systems » 
TEAMS-Designer,” n.d.).  An FFM will identify the Failure Effect Propagation Paths (FEPP) 
from a failure mode back to the sensor that detected the anomaly.  It then uses the archived maps 
to identify the potential failure sources or modes that are consistent with the system response to 
the anomaly (Ferrell, Lewis, Perotti, Oostdyk, & Brown, 2010).    
Anomaly Detection and Fault Isolation 
This paper has reviewed the topics of anomaly detection and fault isolation separately as 
approaches to developing the corresponding models differ substantially.  This is further 
necessitated as the forthcoming architectural framework will have to treat the models 
independently.  It should be noted that the academic literature often combines these two areas of 
study into a single topic.  There is compelling rationale to take this approach as both detection 
and isolation must occur before corrective action(s) take place.  This complexity of complex 
models is the driving force behind the need for an architectural framework that can integrate 
many ‘modules’ that will comprise fault detection and isolation schemes. 
System Engineering Tools 
This research effort is focused on building a framework that enables the current anomaly 
detection and fault isolation technologies.  Such a framework must be capable of integrating a 
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multitude of potential models to meet user requirements (many still in development).  In 
addition, it shall be readily adaptable so that it can be ‘custom-fitted’ to meet specific mission 
requirements for the various operations it is envisioned to support.  With an assortment of 
models and algorithms available (each with its own unique specialty) and the numerous 
requirements anticipated, a systems engineering approach is deemed the best method to manage 
the complex architecture development.  After an initial survey of the available tools, System 
Modeling Language (SysML) is the application selected to support this research effort 
(“OMGSysML-v1.3-12-06-02.pdf,” n.d.).  A complete specification of SysML can be found in 
(Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2012a). 
 
Model-based systems engineering supports analysis, specification, design, and verification of the 
system by organizing activities through formalized representations of the system referred to as 
models.  This methodology enhances the quality of the design process, supports reuse of the 
various output components and augments the identification of system impacts should subsequent 
design changes be considered (Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2012b) (Cressent, David, Idasiak, 
& Kratz, 2010). 
 
SysML is a derivative of the Unified Modeling Language (UML).  UML has become a very 
popular tool used to develop large-scale, complex software applications across multiple 
platforms.  As UML is software-centric, SysML was developed to apply the successful UML 
techniques to the system engineering field in all areas (not just software engineering).  To 
support an application base that includes both hardware (mechanical, fluids, electrical) and 
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software applications, SysML reuses and extends a subset of UML 2.1 constructs (Johnson, 
Kerzhner, Paredis, & Burkhart, 2012, para. 1.1):  
• Extends UML classes into blocks 
• Enables requirements modeling 
• Supports parametric modeling 
• Extends UML dependencies into allocations 
• Reuses and modifies UML activities 
• Extends UML standard ports into flow ports 
 
Utilizing the SysML language, models can be produced that are capable of describing the system 
in detail.  Disciplinary engineers use analytical tools to accomplish design and analysis tasks.  If 
there are times when a study (cost, risk, tradeoff, etc.) requires both system and analytical 
information, this must be manually obtained from each application.  There are system 
engineering tools that bridge this gap and integrate the corresponding information and 
subsequent updates (Kim, Fried, Menegay, Soremekun, & Oster, 2013).  This points out that a 
single system engineering tool may not be sufficient to achieve research goals, and SysML may 
have to be augmented with a compliment of supporting tools. 
 
The European Space Agency (ESA) has a facility called the Concurrent Design Facility (CDF) 
that is a state-of-the-art program in the field of concurrent engineering and system engineering 
research.  The CDF is used to perform feasibility studies for potential future space missions.  
They currently build system engineering models using Excel, and decided to test a model-based 
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system engineering approach using SysML.  The MBSE model was considered applicable to the 
concurrent engineering approach.  They selected a case study on a project called Near Earth 
Exploration Minimum System.  The results of their testing are mixed with complaints about the 
significant amount of time to build the model with too little added value.  However, their final 
conclusion was that SysML modeling should be paired to work in conjunction with their current 
integrated design model as they see potential in this tool as the technology matures (de Lange, 
Guo, & de Koning, 2012).   
 
There is a French program developing a ramjet powered vehicle capable of reaching speeds 
between Mach 4 and 8 (called LEA).  A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was 
performed on the components that make up the vehicle.  They input the FMEA results into 
SysML identifying all the blocks and parts and establishing the hierarchy between these items.  
Then they mapped each component using ports and connectors.  With several system 
architectures to choose from, the resulting model allowed the final decision to include the failure 
mode of the system (Cressent et al., 2010).  In fault isolation modeling, a FMEA is routinely the 
first document assessed as much of the work in identifying the failure modes and components 
involved is complete.  SysML’s diagraming tools allow for suitable characterization of these 
failures and this technique could be adapted to developing a fault isolation model. 
 
Recognizing the trend in model-based system engineering (MBSE), NASA's Langley Research 
Center initiated a project to test this technique.  They implemented a pilot program to evaluate 
MBSE methodology and centered it on the early phase of the Materials International Space 
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Station Experiment-X (MISSE-X).  MISSE-X is designed to be installed on the exterior of the 
international space station in which experiments reside that “advance the technology readiness of 
materials and devices necessary for future space exploration.”  The goal was to develop a SysML 
model that could capture requirements, behavior, architecture and operating environment of the 
experiment.  The results of the pilot program showed that the investment of effort in MBSE is 
substantial, but one that produced noteworthy returns (Vipavetz, Murphy, & Infeld, 2012). 
Gap Analysis 
A gap analysis on the reviewed literature is essential to determine if a research gap exists, thus 
identifying an area for which additional study is appropriate. The review was structured such that 
the literature cited would best support the research topic.  However, since the goal is to find a 
research area that may benefit from additional study, a lack of conclusive references specific to 
the topic should be expected.  To determine if the documents reviewed are supportive to this 
research effort, certain questions are asked to include: 
• Anomaly Detection/Fault Isolation 
o What is the scope of existing anomaly detection and fault isolation 
applications? 
o Are they specific to an application or more general and used universally? 
o Can anomaly detection techniques be used for fault isolation (and vice-
versa)? 
o Are multiple anomaly detection/fault isolation models presented? 
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 Are the models specific to anomaly detection or fault isolation, or 
are they cross functional? 
 Are these models integrated so that they work collectively? 
o Is there an architecture defined for the model (or multiple models)? 
• System Engineering Tools 
o Which methods/tools are used for framework development? 
o Are there existing applications supporting space operations? 
o Are there existing applications focused on anomaly detection and/or fault 
isolation? 
o  Is there a conceptual detector and/or isolator framework already in-place?  
The literature review concentrated on three areas to include anomaly detection, fault isolation 
and system engineering tools from which to build a model.  During the review, it was found that 
the majority of the anomaly detectors and fault isolators were “specialists.”  These techniques 
often had narrow design functions targeting specific technologies.  Even the data driven 
applications, those that are effective without insight into the physics behind the system, have to 
be fine-tuned to recognize system operational nuances. As this research effort is intended to be 
applicable to complex systems, the use of multiple anomaly detectors and/or fault isolators is 
anticipated to be the norm.  Therefore, it is important that any resulting framework must be able 
to integrate multiple and diverse applications. 
 
The gap analysis commenced by identifying the characteristics that support development of a 
standardized framework for designing anomaly detection/fault isolation systems.   The research 
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literature was then reviewed and documents that met the selected characteristics were identified.  
These characteristics were divided into three separate categories.  The first category simply 
identified the documents as being related to either anomaly detection, fault isolation or research 
that supports framework development, thus matching the three focus areas mentioned above.  
Referenced literature that did not meet one of these characteristics was excluded from the gap 
analysis.  
 
It was not unusual to find research that included both anomaly detection and fault isolation as 
these topics are often combined to meet industrial needs.  However, it should be noted that 
literature involving anomaly detection or fault isolation did not include framework development 
methods for selecting these types of applications.  Nor did any of the framework development 
literature reviewed involve applications specific to anomaly detection or fault isolation content. 
 
The next category centered on the anomaly detection and fault isolation literature.  These 
characteristics first included the class of technology that these detectors/isolators fit as outlined 
earlier in this literature review (reference table 2).  This classification allowed for identifying 
common techniques between the anomaly detection and fault isolation applications.  Another 
characteristic within this group then keyed on whether these works pertained to multiple models, 
and if so, did the research integrate these models together.  This is considered important as the 
eventual detection/isolation system developed will likely be comprised of multiple models.  The 
last characteristic in this category highlighted any of the works that included an architecture 
depicting the models. 
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The third category addresses the system engineering practices for generating a framework that 
standardizes anomaly detection and fault isolation system development.  The first characteristic 
within this category refers to whether the literature includes SysML and/or MBSE techniques for 
system development.  Next it identifies those works where SysML/MBSE has been applied to 
anomaly detection or fault isolation applications.  Finally, it determines if architectural 
development is already occurred these areas.  Reference Table 2 - Gap Analysis Summary for a 
summary of the gap analysis results. 
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Table 2 - Gap Analysis Summary 
 
Anomoly Detection
Fault Isolation
Framework Development
Clasification
Nearest Neighbor
Clustering
Statistical
Physics Based
Expert Systems
Functional Fault M
apping
M
ultiple M
odels
M
odels Integrated
Archetecture Defined
SysM
L/M
BSE
AD and/or FI Application(s)
AD/FI Architecture Defined
Researchers
Abdul-Aziz, et al, 2011 X X X X X
Angeli, 2010 X X
Bay & Schwabacher, 2003 X X
Chandola, et al., 2009 X X X X X X
Cressant, et al., 2010 X X
Daigle, et al., 2011 X X X
De Lange, et al., 2012 X X
De Stefano, et al., 2000 X X
Ferrell, et al., 2010 X X
Gogoi, et al., 2011 X X X X X
Friedenthal, et al., 2012 X X
Iverson, et al., 2012 X X
Johnson, et al., 2012 X X
Kim, et al., 2013 X X
Kodavade & Apte, 2012 X X X
Mackey, et al., 2010 X X X X X
Martin, et al., 2010 X X X X
Mathews, et al., 2011 X X
Marzat, et al., 2011 X X X X
Murugavel & Prunithavalli, 2011 X X X
Omar, et al., 2013 X X X X X
Osipov, et al., 2011 X X
Park, et al., 2001 X X X X
Puig, et al., 2008 X X X
Russell, et al., 2011 X X X X X X X
Schwabacher, et al., 2010 X X X X X X X X
Schwabacher, et al., 2009 X X X X X
Vipavetz, et al., 2012 X X
Wu, 2005 X X X X X
Clark, 2015 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Category Sys EngAnomoly Detection/Fault Isolation
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Gap Analysis Observations 
The various characteristics have been identified from the literature reviewed and this information 
has been consolidated in table 3.  Inspection of this table shows that ‘gaps’ do appear to exist in 
relation to the research topic.  The following observations summarize areas in which conclusive 
research is absent: 
• The literature involving anomaly detection/fault isolation (AD/FI) did not include 
an architecture as to how these applications should be selected and used.  Those works 
that had the ‘architecture defined’ feature selected (Kodavade & Apte, Schwabacher, et 
al.) only had an upper-level depiction of the architecture specific to the model(s) being 
presented. 
• The SysML/MBSE references did present several instances of applications related 
to space operations processing.  However, none presented methods for developing a 
framework specific to AD/FI applications. 
• There was little research encountered related to integrating multiple models.  
Much of the AD/FI literature was specific to a single application.  Several surveys 
described multiple models (Abdul-Aziz, et al., Chandola, et al., Gogoi, et al. and Omar, et 
al.) but these works did not attempt to integrate the models exhibited.  Park provides an 
overview of an integrated anomaly detection scheme called ‘BEAM,’ but the emphasis of 
the article is on a single module within this system (Park et al., 2002).  Russell and 
Schwabacher both present integrated AD/FI systems (with mixed results), but each uses 
an unique framework (Russell et al., 2011) (M. A. Schwabacher et al., 2010b).  None of 
the literature reviewed provides the methodology for AD/FI application selection.  
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Literature Review Summary 
A survey of the literature was performed on the topics of anomaly detection and fault isolation, 
as well as system engineering tools that could be used to develop a detection/isolation 
framework.  Numerous models are available in both model-based and data-driven classes.  The 
algorithms involved tend to be ‘specialists’ in that they are most effective for selective failure 
modes and/or component types.  Therefore, it is anticipated that a detector/isolator system will be 
comprised of multiple applications so that it is effective on the complex system for which it is 
being designed 
 
The primary method of anomaly detection is an exception-based method.  This method notifies 
an operator if design or operational limits are exceeded.  Data-driven models have found a role in 
complex, dynamical systems, and function by detecting outliers in the data which have not yet 
exceeded predetermined limits.  Such models can disregard the physics behind the system 
allowing for distribution across multiple systems, though detection accuracy is dependent on the 
quality of training data and effectiveness of the scoring-algorithm.  Fault isolation techniques 
tend to be model-based as system knowledge is required to isolate the fault to its source.  
Isolation is a difficult task as systems often lack the requisite sensor data, hence lacking the 
necessary insight for accurate identification.  This difficulty is further compounded by large 
numbers of potential sources to evaluate within complex systems.   
 
An architectural framework that combines these methods is desirable.  A model based system 
engineering tool, SysML, shall be used to evaluate the premise that such a framework is possible.  
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A descriptive model that can assist with analysis, specification, design and verification of this 
concept is the desired outcome.  
 
A gap analysis was performed on the literature reviewed.  The analysis shows that a gap exists in 
the methodology for selecting anomaly detection and fault isolation applications.  In addition, the 
review was unable to uncover a systematic approach for a selection process using model-based 
system engineering techniques.  This dissertation will pursue this line of research.   
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter depicts the methodology used in this dissertation.  It provides a road map towards 
developing a framework that can standardize the selection of anomaly detection and fault 
isolation applications that can best be integrated into a desired system.  This design addresses the 
research gap identified and provides a process by which the research objectives can be realized. 
Methodology 
This research topic originated from an observation that anomaly detection and fault isolation 
applications were selected based more on availability than on ability to meet system needs.  
Initial research was unable to uncover a practice that could assist a user with this selection 
process.  In addition, this preliminary research determined that a significant amount of research 
has been generated related to anomaly detection and fault isolation techniques.  Much of this 
research has not been applied in commercial applications.  This led to the Problem Statement 
described in Chapter 1.  
 
A framework that standardizes this selection process using system engineering principles is the 
goal of this research.  Such a model must be able to pair numerous and unique detection/isolation 
techniques to a variety of applications in a way that maximizes efficiency of the integrated 
system.  Figure 3 - Research Methodology Diagram illustrates how this study will go forward to 
meet this objective.    
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Problem Statement 
The research process starts by first identifying a ‘problem,’ or an area that could benefit from 
additional academic-level research.   In this case, the focus is on anomaly detection and fault 
isolation applications that could be used in space operation systems.  Little research could be 
found on existing architectural templates that could integrate these applications into the 
designated systems.  More specifically, there is an absence of a methodological process for 
generating anomaly detection and fault isolation designs to either embed within new system 
concepts, or supplement existing schemes. 
Research Objectives 
The next step is to generate objectives that will work towards resolving the problem area 
identified.  Achieving these objectives is the goal of this study (and meeting this goal signals that 
the dissertation research effort is complete).  The objectives for this research include: 
• Develop a framework that standardizes how users can augment a system with 
detection/isolation capabilities   
o Framework to use system engineering principles 
o System can be either existing or a new design 
o Framework to provide a means to rank or optimize detectors and 
isolators under consideration 
• Validate the model by experimentation using actual space operation systems data 
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Literature Review 
A comprehensive literature review is performed to survey relevant works that may exist 
addressing the problem identified.  A thorough review aids in bounding the research problem and 
directing the path forward.  A literature review expands insight into the chosen topic, and allows 
for assessing related prevailing concepts.  More specifically, the review includes discovering the 
various detection/isolation methodologies already developed and understanding the variables that 
make up the different technologies.  These applications have been categorized into class-objects 
as this organization will assist with model development.  Insight is also gained by identifying 
relationships among the system applications for which these detectors/isolators are designed to 
support. 
Gap Analysis  
After a literature review is complete and the effort summarized, a gap analysis is performed to 
determine where existing research efforts are lacking.  Research gaps in the designated field are 
an indication that those areas could benefit from additional study.  In this case, conclusive 
references specific to system engineering techniques that support development of a 
detector/isolator framework were not discovered, thus signifying that this topic is deserving of 
further pursuit. 
Synthesis 
Identifying all the pertinent data is the first step in generating a framework.  When an anomaly 
occurs, it is expected to ‘disrupt’ the sensor array thus signaling an operator that the system is 
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diverging from nominal.  A domain expert (or an algorithm) must then ‘interpret’ the deviations 
observed from the instrumentation, and using a logical process of elimination, isolate the 
problem to a specific subsystem or component fault.  At this point, remedial action (if required) 
can be considered.  Therefore, an important relationship exists between the type of anomalies 
that can occur and the availability/arrangement of sensors used to monitor the system.  These are 
the primary dataset sources that will support this research. 
Failure Identification 
As the goal of this research is the enhancement of anomaly detection and fault isolation 
capabilities of complex systems, the potential failures that can occur must be quantified to 
encompass all that can operationally impair the system.  If a ‘Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis’ (FMEA) has been accomplished on the system, then potential faults may have already 
been identified.  Fault-tree analysis is a technique that can be used to scope the potential failures 
for a component or system.  Each of the fault-tree’s basic or intermediate events denotes a failure 
that can impact the functionality of the top-level item indicated.     
 
Not all failures will impact system performance.  For example, a cabinet that houses system 
instrumentation inside a conditioned room with a broken latch may be considered a benign 
failure.  The same broken-latch cabinet mounted outside may have more ominous consequences 
while operating during inclement weather.  Therefore, failure criticality must be taken into 
consideration when determining those problems that require inclusion.  In addition, some 
potential problems may have an extremely low probability of occurring.  A pipe support tends to 
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be a static structure designed to carry more than its prescribed load.  This precludes having to 
instrument each and every pipe support even though a support failure could result in damage to a 
crucial pipe run.  A risk analysis (criticality vs. probability) can be used to maintain the list of 
potential failures at a manageable level and remain focused on credible issues that threaten 
system performance.     
 
As the path forward in developing this framework is guided by a systems engineering approach, 
defining requirements will be an essential element to this process.  The inventory of failures 
generated by this analysis will lead to a corresponding requirement that states the failure mode 
shall be detected.    
System Monitoring 
The principal limitation in the ability to fully detect/isolate anomalies can be directly correlated 
to the system instrumentation.  Instrumentation must be embedded within the remote hardware it 
is evaluating, and communicate via a C&C subsystem to provide operator feedback.  This is 
costly and makes it impractical to include a sensor for every possible failure mode.  These 
indicators too are susceptible to failure which results in some system degradation (for non-
redundant sensors) as a reduction in visibility occurs.  The first question routinely asked when a 
measurement alarms is, “Did the sensor fail?”  In addition, unwanted actions may occur as 
automated processes may be invoked that are linked to (failed) instrument data. 
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For remote systems, the operator’s ‘view’ is restricted to what the sensor array provides.  The 
instrumentation encompassed within a design will have a specific purpose for its inclusion.  
Typically, it will meet operational requirements for monitoring the system functionality in 
general, as well as supporting various tasks.  These operational requirements will bound the 
measurement to a tolerance range, and induce an alarm should the tolerance be exceeded.  This is 
where the various anomaly detection techniques come into play.  They are not limited to 
monitoring a specific measurement for a specific operational band.  Instead, they look at the 
system or subsystems as a whole and extrapolate information from multiple sensors.  This 
method uses both direct and indirect measurements to infer system health.   
 
Using, for example, a valve that fails to indicate closed after being commanded to that state.  The 
fact that the close switch never went on was a direct indication of that valve’s state.  However, 
this one indicator should not be taken at face value, but treated only as an alarm that something is 
amiss.  A fault tree may show numerous faults that can lead to a valve malfunctioning.  In 
addition to the closed indicator remaining OFF, Table 3 - Valve Fault Scenarios, describes sensor 
feedback that will assist in determining the valve’s current position.  For all three possible states, 
multiple sensors must be evaluated to corroborate that position.  This process is anomaly 
detection.  It is not limited to simply fielding an alarm, but using this alarm combined with other 
indications (both anomalous and nominal) to determine the system’s current state.   
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Table 3 - Valve Fault Scenarios 
Valve Position Sensor Feedback 
Open 
Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous) 
Open Limit Switch Remained ON (anomalous) 
No changes to immediate upstream/downstream pressures or 
temperatures (anomalous) 
Partially 
Open/Closed 
Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous) 
Open limit switch goes OFF (valve moved) (nominal) 
Downstream pressure drops some, but not fully (anomalous) 
Closed Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous) Open limit switch goes OFF (valve moved) (nominal) 
Downstream pressure drops completely (nominal) 
 
Fault isolation is the process of using the sensor array to pinpoint the source of the fault to a 
specific component (or base-event on a fault tree).  This too is important as it assists in 
determining the extent of the anomaly’s impact.  If the example valve did in fact close, this 
would imply the close limit switch failed per the fault scenarios above (reference Table 3 - Valve 
Fault Scenarios).  However, if the failure was due to a failed discrete processing card in the C&C 
subsystem, then it may have other implications as these cards typically contain multiple 
indicators.  This requires that all measurements that can provide any insight into an anomaly be 
identified for that anomalous condition.   
Datasets 
Several datasets have been identified to support this research project.  First, all potential 
anomalies must be identified.  This will be accomplished using fault-tree analysis at the 
component level.  A risk analysis will limit the collection of faults by ruling out those deemed 
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non-credible based on probability and criticality of the failure.  Next, all system sensors must be 
described.  These will be cataloged to the type of failure they can detect and subsystem they 
support.     
 
A matrix can be generated that combines these datasets and relates this information at a 
component level.  For each fault, any indicators that can provide awareness to that component 
and supporting subsystems will be listed.  In addition, when multiple measurements are required 
to make a judgment, the matrix must be able to distinguish those sensors that must collaborate 
with others to make a failure determination. 
 
The Space Shuttle program’s Problem Reporting and Compliance Application (PRACA) 
repository contains all non-conformances reported for both the LH2 and LO2 systems.  This will 
be a valuable source of actual issues that can support both model testing and validation.  
Synthetic problems may also need to be generated to account for credible problems not 
encountered during critical Shuttle operations.  
Preliminary Framework Development 
This section focuses on developing a preliminary framework.  This framework begins with the 
data synthesis just described.  In keeping with a systems engineering approach in this research 
effort, a Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) application will be employed for framework 
development.  This application will meet SysML language standards.  SysML is derived from 
UML in that it has been extended to support both hardware and software development.  An 
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MBSE model has several advantages that support this effort.  First, the ability to make changes 
and analyze the subsequent impact will be beneficial when it comes time to fit the various 
detectors/isolators onto the designated system.  Next, the capability to reuse objects created can 
reduce the overall effort, a process that can be quite tedious for a complex system.  A SysML 
modeling tool enforces the language rules and also provides means for tracking requirements and 
validating the model which are important features for this project. 
 
With a modeling approach selected, initial framework development involves examination of the 
detection/isolation techniques and a means to organize these applications by variables that 
support the framework design.  These applications will be aligned into classes (and sub-classes) 
consistent with the groupings outlined within the literature review.  Each anomaly detection and 
fault isolation class will be labeled by both their capabilities and interface.  The capabilities (or 
behaviors) will be used to determine which requirements they can satisfy, and the interface will 
identify the inputs/outputs for that application.  This preliminary framework will result in 
detection/isolation ‘modules’ that are ready for system inclusion in a model-based environment.    
Case Study 
A space-operations related case study will be presented that showcases the implementation of the 
proposed framework.  In this case, a system to augment with a detector/isolator application is 
necessary.  To meet this need, the cryogenic liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LO2) 
systems at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have been selected.  These systems, located at the 
launch pad, were used to fill the Space Shuttle’s external tank with propellant and oxidizer for 
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the Shuttle’s three main engines (and are slated for use again with the next NASA Space Launch 
System (SLS) program).  Due to the hazardous aspects of these operations, the pad systems are 
operated remotely in a control room located approximately three miles away.  In addition, the 
cryogenic properties of the propellant dictates that loading the Shuttle occurred within hours of 
launch leaving little time to resolve issues that arise in narrow launch windows.  These time-
critical and high-risk operations makes the designated systems good candidates to be ‘outfitted’ 
with anomaly detection and fault isolation enhancements.  
 
This case study involves taking the LH2 system initially and replicating it in an MBSE format.  
A unique approach is planned that models the system not only as it operates nominally, but as a 
system of ‘failures.’  This involves capturing the component states at a given failure mode and 
modeling the subsequent actions (behavior) as an impact to the sensor array.  It is envisioned that 
this method will better enable the detector/isolator selection process.  Being able to match the 
application capabilities directly to failure modes they are designed to detect should facilitate the 
application-system pairing process.  
 
This initial modeling includes identifying those components and assemblies in which 
detection/isolation attributes are desired as these will evolve into requirements.  At this point, the 
anomaly detection and fault isolation modules will be integrated into the model.  The goal here is 
to ensure all potential fault sources are covered and corresponding system requirements are being 
satisfied.  Legacy LH2 system problem data will be available for ingestion into the model while 
developing and testing this case study. 
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Evaluation 
This section centers on the analysis of the case study results.  This includes verifying the 
progressing design to include confirmation that requirements are fulfilled and all system 
interfaces are identified.  During evaluation, a methodology will be developed that optimizes the 
component selection.  By optimal, it will assume a design that meets requirements while 
lessening complexity, and subsequently, the aggregate cost for design, implementation and 
procurement.  This will be accomplished by minimizing the number of detection/isolator 
applications and enabling data sharing via common interfaces.  The advantage to an MBSE 
approach is the capability to insert/remove various components (from both system and/or 
detector/isolator applications) and assess the overall impact on the design.  This is expected to 
ease process development.  Finally, the resultant data will be interpreted, synthesized, and all 
findings uncovered shall be reported.  
Framework 
Testing via the system (and problem data) provided from the case study, evaluation of the results 
and framework development is expected to be an iterative process.  This task will focus on 
capturing this process and will ultimately define the framework.  The initial phase will 
continuously modify the model until a (sufficiently) functional framework emerges.  This will be 
followed by fine-tuning the framework to achieve some optimizing characteristics for the 
selection process.   
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Once the resultant framework is specified, it will be validated.  This will be accomplished by 
using the framework to augment the LO2 system with anomaly detection and fault isolation 
capabilities.  Both real system faults (legacy) and synthetic problems will be used to test the 
model.  This section concludes when a framework can be validated that ideally meets the 
research objectives.    
Conclusion 
The conclusion will summarize the research to include analysis, interpretations, findings, results 
and concluding remarks.  This will also comprise the various accomplishments and their relation 
to the research objectives.  Recommendations will be suggested for future work from either 
related questions raised during the study in areas that may benefit from closer examination, or for 
the next logical path in further developing a standard that integrates anomaly detection and fault 
isolation technologies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter proposes a preliminary framework that forms the foundation from which this 
research effort is based.   This framework will describe the principles and procedures used to pair 
anomaly detection and fault isolation (AD/FI) applications to new or existing complex systems.  
This framework involves a multi-stage process as outlined below: 
• Ascertain and scope the system to be augmented 
• Identify and categorize the sensor data available for ingest 
• Identify and categorize the potential system faults 
• Identify and categorize the possible AD/FI applications for consideration 
• Model the system 
• Model the AD/FI techniques 
• Perform MBSE-centered ‘trade studies’ of the various AD/FI techniques 
o Evaluate/analyze those tested 
• Make recommendation(s) 
 
Some of these processes may work in parallel while others have distinct predecessors and/or 
successors.  Reference Figure 4 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow for a process flow 
diagram of the initial framework. 
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System Scope 
The first step is to define the system to be enhanced with AD/FI capabilities and determine the 
scope to which detection is required.  This scope not only includes the breath or boundaries of 
the system, it is also comprised of the level of granularity to which detection abilities are 
applicable.  These boundaries should encompass the system itself, the sensors that provide 
Framework
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Categorize 
Fault Modes
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Sensor Data
Identify & 
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AD/FI Apps
Model the 
System
Model the 
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Figure 4 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow 
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feedback to the operators and the command-and-control subsystems (both reception and transmit 
locales).   
 
The level of detail at which the detection capabilities must function must also be defined.  This 
detail level will be dependent on the system design combined with requirements derived from the 
stakeholders.  Typically, this detail will go to the component level at which a specific element is 
replaced.  However, when the system includes redundant subassemblies or process legs, then 
detection may be required only for this level as the secondary assembly/process may be brought 
online should the primary subsystem fail. 
 
  Scoping the system should also identify AD/FI capabilities that already exist within the system.  
This can avoid unnecessary overlap in cases where existing techniques are robust.  It may also 
identify cases where additional enhancement is required for capabilities that may be 
underprovided. 
Sensor Array 
The sensors are the principal means of providing visibility into the health and status of a remote 
operated system for those monitoring its performance.  This is also the limiting factor in the 
ability to determine if an anomaly is occurring and what is the root cause for that problem.  The 
sensors are designed into the system in positions that communicate key information for specific 
operational scenarios.  For complex systems, it may take many such measurements to provide an 
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adequate status.  Often, system health and status is inferred from a combination of indicators, and 
not necessarily as that specific measurement were originally intended to be used. 
 
As the sensor array provides the view of the system, it is very important to identify all the 
sensors available within the system.  These indicators will determine the detail level scope at 
which the system will be modeled.  There is no need to provide high granularity detail if the 
sensor array does not provide high resolution visibility.  Once the sensors are identified, they 
must then be categorized based on the type of data they provide.  This will include both direct 
and indirect information that can be gathered from these indicators.  This is a key step.  Many of 
the AD/FI techniques are based on their ability to garner bits of information from multiple 
sensors and provide an accurate depiction of the system status. 
Determine Potential Faults 
All potential faults that can adversely impact system performance must be identified.  The 
resulting list will drive requirement development stating that the system shall have the capability 
to detect such faults    This will initially be accomplished using a fault tree analysis approach.  
Fault trees are a graphical method that model component failures and also show how such 
failures can propagate through the system (Ruijters & Stoelinga, 2015).  As the name implies, 
this is a tree structure that identifies basic (circle) and intermediate (rectangle) events that could 
possibly lead to the issue denoted in the top-level block.  These events (or failures) follow a path 
towards this top-level anomaly, and this path is controlled by AND or OR gates.  Reference 
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Figure 5 - Valve Component Fault Tree for a partially developed fault-tree representing a remote 
operated valve).     
 
A systematic approach should be applied to bind the number of potential faults.  Initially, this 
will encompasses all components at the operational level at which they are replaced should a 
failure occur.  However, there may be circumstances when it is not practical to provide detail all 
the way down to the component level.  This could include cases where the component is not that 
critical and its loss will have minor, if any, impact on the system.  In addition, there may be 
redundant process legs that can be completely isolated from one another.  The failure mode in 
this scenario need only be identified to one of the redundant subassemblies.  Finally, the system 
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visibility provided by the sensor array will likely not cover 100% of the system components, thus 
the system design forces a reduction in failure modes for inclusion. 
Fault Reduction from Sensor Capability 
The sensor array will be the primary factor in resolving the failure modes identified by the fault 
tree to those in consideration for the framework.  For those components that have some degree of 
sensor oversight, criticality will be assumed (and assumed non-critical if sensor visibility is 
lacking).  If indicator granularity can only provide insight to a subassembly level, then the 
corresponding failure mode will only be identified to this level. 
 
A ‘Failures vs. Measurements’ table was produced using the fault-tree failures and a hypothetical 
suite of corresponding measurements (reference Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix).  This 
table uses a “D” to denote an indicator that directly monitors for a particular failure.  Assuming 
that sensor has not failed, then it is a sufficient data point to ascertain the corresponding failure 
mode as the problem source.  An “I” represents an indirect measurement.  These cannot 
exclusively determine the failure mode and require additional collaboration to reach a 
conclusion.   
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Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix 
 
The above matrix (Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix) can be used to further reduce the 
number of failure modes.  If a failure mode results in duplicate ‘mode vs. sensor’ allocation, then 
these are candidates for merging into a single problem.  In this case, the instrumentation may 
detect a valve failure, but cannot distinguish between Seat Contamination, Valve Binding, Valve 
Structural Failure or Actuator Structural Failure.   
 
In the process of scaling down potential faults due to sensor limitations, it will not be unusual to 
find gaps in the design that may allow critical processes to fail without detection.  This can be 
related to a design process that focuses on operational requirements.  By performing an analysis 
of the various fault modes, weaknesses in sensor types and distribution may be uncovered.  This 
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is a key point, and one that emphasizes the need to complete the arduous task of identifying the 
majority of the potential faults.  The task of selecting AD/FI should be biased heavily towards 
anomalous conditions and less so towards nominal operations. 
Anomaly Detection/Fault Isolation Applications 
A review of the available AD/FI techniques should be performed to determine which 
applications should be considered for system inclusion.  This will be based on the requirements 
generated that the application is expected to satisfy.  It should not be assumed that a single 
application will suffice.  An ‘all-purpose’ algorithm may give up precision to accommodate a 
broad detection capability while issue-specific methods may provide the needed accuracy, but 
fulfill fewer requirements.  Several factors may be used to prescreen which techniques will be 
applicable for the given circumstance.  These can include: 
• Budget  
o License costs to purchase an existing application 
 Setup costs to ‘customize’ the application for the given 
system 
o Costs to develop a non-commercially available application 
o Maintenance and data gathering to support functionality  
o Hardware platforms/system integration  
• Effectiveness 
o Meets requirements 
o Specific functionality vs. general application 
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o Accuracy 
 Captures all (most) issues 
 Minimal ‘false’ alarms 
 
The AD/FI applications will be addressed as classes that describe how their corresponding 
techniques function.  The framework will make a recommendation at this class level.  Therefore, 
it will be incumbent on the user to determine if commercial applications exist from which to 
select the final product, or if development of a custom application is required.  The following list 
outlines the AD/FI classes that will be developed for this framework. 
• Anomaly Detectors 
o Rule Based 
o Nearest Neighbor 
o Clustering Algorithms 
o Neural Network 
o Statistical/Parametric 
o One-Class Support Vector Machines 
• Fault Isolators 
o Physics Model 
o Expert Systems 
o Fault Map Model 
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Model the System 
Using a model-based system engineering (MBSE) approach, the system will be modeled by 
means of the system modeling language (SysML).  SysML uses a complement of diagrams to 
portray the system graphically for users and stakeholders.  These diagrams provide a ’view’ of a 
portion of that system.  However, there is an underlying structure that connects the various 
diagrams and interrelates with the model elements that are generated.  The package diagrams 
will be used to portray the structure of the model.  When modeling the system, the following list 
highlights fundamental elements that will be used to compose the model.   
• System Structure 
• System Behavior 
• Constraints 
• Requirements 
• Include Existing AD/FI Capabilities 
The SysML diagrams are designed to support model development specific for this functionality.  
These elements are explained in detail in the following sections. 
System Structure 
The system will be modeled by first focusing on the system structure.  The SysML block 
definition diagram (BDD) and internal block diagram (IBD) are used to define the system 
structure.  The fundamental element of structure in SysML is called a block which is used to 
represent systems, subassemblies and components (among other abstractions).  A BDD is used to 
describe the structural schema of a system, and is composed of blocks that show their 
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relationship with other blocks.  A BDD was generated for a ‘remote operated valve’ assembly as 
an example (reference Figure 6 - BDD for Remote Operated Valve Assembly).  This BDD shows 
that the Remote Operated Valve is composed of an Actuator, Valve and open/close Solenoid 
Valves.  The valve is also composed of 1 or 2 limit switches.  
 
An IBD is used to show the internal connections of the parts within a block.  This is used when 
there is a desire to add resolution to the composition of a block.  An IBD was produced 
(reference Figure 7 - IBD/Remote Operated Valve Assembly) that uses the parts that make up 
bdd [Package] Operational Domain Model [Remote Operated Valv e]     
«block»
RemoteOperatedValv e
parts
  : PriCloseSV
  : Actuator
  : PriOpenSV
  : Valve
«block»
Valv e
parts
  : LimitSwitches
«block»
Actuator
flowProperties
 inout 750_GN2
«block»
LimitSwitches
«block»
PriOpenSV
«block»
PriCloseSV
1..2LS
Act CSVOSVVlv
Figure 6 - BDD for Remote Operated Valve Assembly 
61 
 
the Remote Operated Valve block (per figure 6).  This diagram shows how the various parts 
interface with one another.   The parts include ‘ports’ that reveal some type of media is passed 
between those parts.  In this case, if the open and closed solenoid valves are energized, 750 
pounds per square inch (PSIG) of gaseous nitrogen (GN2) is applied to the actuator’s open side 
while the closed side is vented.  This forces the actuator to move upward which opens the valve 
(connected by valve stem).  
 
System Behavior 
SysML also provides diagrams that depict system behavior to include Activity, Sequence, State 
Machines and Use Cases.  A use case diagram is simply used to show (typically) high level use 
cases that the system may perform.  A sequence diagram shows the interactions among the 
ibd [Block] RemoteOperatedValv e [RemoteOperatedValv e]     
«flowPort» ActClose
«flowPort» ActOpen ValveStem
: Actuator
: Valve
«flowSpecific...
Pwr_28VDC
«flowSpecific...
Act_750GN2
«flowPort»
SV_Close
«flowPort» PwrVDC
: PriCloseSV
«flowPort»
SV_Open
«flowPort» PwrVDC
: PriOpenSV
Figure 7 - IBD/Remote Operated Valve Assembly 
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various system elements (or environment) based on ‘messages’ between these elements.  These 
two diagrams will be used in this framework to a lesser degree (if at all).  
  
To model system behavior, this effort will concentrate on capturing that behavior using activity 
and state machine diagrams.  An activity diagram is used to portray behavior over time with an 
emphasis on the flow of matter, energy and data among a set of actions (Delligatti, 2013).  State 
machines focus on event based behavior, and show how the system reacts to an event via state 
changes of the model elements.  These events are often asynchronous which is consistent with 
anomaly occurrence within a system.  State machine diagrams will be used to represent anomaly 
events and the subsequent impact these events have on the system in the form of state changes.  
This is a very important aspect of the modeling effort.  Modeling the failure modes will enable 
the ability to adapt model segments of the AD/FI applications to the system model, and 
subsequently, the ability to test performance of those model sections. 
Constraints 
A parametric diagram is used to express constraints in the form of equations, expressions or rules 
(Holt & Perry, 2013).  This will provide support for analysis in the performance of the AD/FI 
applications being tested.  Violating a constraint is what signals the model that an anomalous 
condition is occurring, thus constraints will be tied closely to the system sensors. 
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Requirements 
A requirements diagram is also provided by the SysML modeling language.  As stated earlier, 
requirements will be generated for those anomalies that the system shall require the capability to 
detect.  The requirements diagram is text based, though it allows one to link requirements to both 
structural and behavioral model elements.  This enhances the traceability between the 
requirement, its implementation and satisfaction. 
Existing AD/FI Capabilities 
When modeling the system, it will be important to identify existing AD/FI capabilities embedded 
within the system.  This will minimize the duplication of capabilities when selecting from the 
various applications, though some overlap will be expected.  Often, these existing capabilities 
will fall short of the desired detection level.  Hence, the need to augment those capabilities with 
additional coverage. 
Model AD/FI Applications 
Similar to modeling the system, the AD/FI applications too must be modeled.  As previously 
stated, a constraint violation will flag the system that an anomaly is occurring.  Therefore, the 
goal in modeling these techniques is to further bind the constraints which results in a higher 
expectation that an exception will occur.  These ’easier’ exceptions should correlate to a quicker 
detection of a problem from a wider range of potential anomalies.  This will be accomplished by 
using the parametric diagrams to capture the application techniques, and then describing these 
techniques in the terms of a system constraint. 
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Trade Studies/Application Evaluations 
Within the SysML literature, it is at times stated that an MBSE approach enables the ability to 
perform trade studies.  However, there is little written that formalizes this process.  This is not 
unusual as SysML does not dictate model methodology, it only specifies the language in the 
form of rules.  The actual model implementation is left to be formed by the user.  
  
As part of the trade study, it is important to evaluate each of the alternatives and quantify the 
value that application can add to the system.  For a complex system, it is unlikely that a ‘one-
size-fits–all’ application will suffice, thus several of the alternatives may be required.  Analysis 
will be required to rank the options.  The goal will be maximizing the effectiveness while 
minimizing the cost (assumed to correlate to the number of applications).  
 
The Object Management Group (OMG), the organization that governs the SysML standard, has 
recognized the necessity of trade studies.  In the current specification for SysML 1.3, the OMG 
includes an Annex for “non-normative extensions” that it may consider for inclusion into the 
language in future versions.  This Annex (D.3) describes the extension of a parametric diagram 
to support trade studies and analysis.  A trade study will be used to evaluate a set of alternative 
AD/FI based on predefined criteria.  An objective function can be used to represent the criteria 
and determine the value of each alternative.  A measure of effectiveness (MOE) will represent a 
parameter with a value that is essential for determining the performance level of the alternative 
applications  (“OMGSysML-v1.3-12-06-02.pdf,” 2012).   
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By extending the SysML language as outlined above, the process of performing the trade study 
and evaluating the alternatives can be accomplished using an MBSE approach.  This effort then 
becomes embedded within the SysML model hierarchy, and subsequently, is available for recall 
if system design artifacts are requested. 
Make Recommendation(s) 
Following the trade study, a list of recommendations should be produced.  These 
recommendations should be consistent with the analysis completed, however they should also 
take into consideration the deficiencies that were observed during this process.  For instance, not 
all of the requirements may have been fully met with the available suite of candidate AD/FI 
applications.  This may drive a modification to the requirement or to the system itself.  It may 
also identify the need for a custom detector/isolator to meet the requirement.  In addition, this 
type of analysis will typically uncover inadequacies in the system design.  This may highlight the 
need for additional sensors to provide added feedback, or it may uncover critical components 
without adequate redundancy.  All such findings should be included in the recommendations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY 
This chapter will present a case study to describe the implementation of the anomaly detection 
(AD) and fault isolation (FI) selection framework.  As stated previously, the system under study 
is the liquid hydrogen (LH2) system at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).  This system is located 
at the launch pads and was used to load both the Apollo and Space Shuttle launch vehicles.  It is 
currently going through a redesign process to support NASA’s next generation Space Launch 
System (SLS) program.   
 
The LH2 system provides the fuel for the launch vehicle’s oxygen/hydrogen engines.  For 
Shuttle, nearly 400,000 gallons of this fuel was loaded into the external tank (ET).  Working with 
LH2 poses many technical challenges.  First, LH2 is a cryogenic fluid at -423 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  This extremely low temperature drives a system design that must be highly insulated 
to minimize the commodity boil-off, and the hardware itself must be able to operate while 
withstanding thermal cycles from ambient to cryogenic temperatures.  As hydrogen is the 
smallest molecule known, it is can prove difficult to keep leak-free within the system, a highly 
desirable feature given that hydrogen is extremely flammable.  Liquid hydrogen also poses risks 
to personnel in that direct exposure will cause severe cryogenic burns, induces asphyxiation if 
released in confined spaces and has a propensity to ignite and/or detonate if large quantities are 
released in air.   
 
These safety concerns, combined with the technical challenges, result in the cryogenic tank 
loading operations being performed remotely with the Pad cleared of all personnel.  The 
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astronauts and support crews do not enter the pad until the initial filling is complete.  At this 
point, only ‘replenish’ loading operations are underway to make up for boil-off losses (over 100 
gallons per minute).  To minimize the boil-off losses, loading operations commence as late as 
possible resulting in a time-critical process.  It is these operationally complex, highly hazardous 
and time-critical characteristics that make this system an ideal candidate to augment with AD/FI 
technology. 
Framework Development 
This case study will follow the proposed framework identified in Chapter 4 for initial system 
model development (reference Figure 8 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow).  As the course 
of developing this case study model is anticipated to be an iterative process, this framework will 
be improved and the implementing details refined as the model matures.  The final framework 
will be presented following analysis in the next chapter. 
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System Scope 
The first step delineated in the proposed framework is to scope the system to be augmented with 
enhanced AD/FI capabilities.  This scope not only includes the breath or boundaries of the 
system, it is also comprised of the level of granularity to which detection abilities are applicable.  
These boundaries should encompass the system itself, the sensors that provide feedback to the 
operators and the command-and-control subsystems (at both reception and transmit locales).   
 
Framework
Process
Scope the 
System
Identify & 
Categorize 
Fault Modes
Identify & 
Categorize 
Sensor Data
Identify & 
Categorize 
AD/FI Apps
Model the 
System
Model the 
AD/FI 
Applications
Perform
AD/FI-System 
Trade Studies
Make 
Recommendations
Figure 8 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow 
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The level of detail at which the detection capabilities must function need also be defined.  This 
detail level will be dependent on the system design combined with requirements derived from the 
stakeholders.  Typically, this detail will go to the component level at which a specific element is 
replaced.  However, when the system includes redundant subassemblies or process legs, then 
detection may be required only for this level as the secondary assembly/process may be brought 
online should the primary subsystem fail. 
 
  Scoping the system should also identify AD/FI capabilities that already exist within the system.  
This can avoid unnecessary overlap in cases where existing techniques are robust.  It may also 
identify cases where additional enhancement is required for capabilities that may be 
underprovided. 
Liquid Hydrogen System 
The LH2 system within the launch pads at KSC was used to fill the fuel portion of the space 
shuttle’s external tank (ET) with nearly 400,000 gallons.  The LH2 was used as the fuel for the 
shuttle’s three main engines.  This same system is planned to support the next generation Space 
Launch System (SLS).  Part of the system resides on the mobile launcher platform (MLP).  The 
shuttle vehicle is mounted on the MLP in the vehicle assembly building (VAB).  The MLP then 
rolls to the pad the LH2 lines are mated at the Pad/MLP interface to ‘complete’ the system.  The 
LH2 system hardware for both the pad and MLP are included in this scope.  The LH2 is stored in 
a vacuum jacketed storage tank with a total capacity of 900,000 gallons.   
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There are three primary hardware subsystems built around this storage tank that enable the 
transfer of LH2 to the flight vehicle.  These include pressurization, transfer and vent systems. In 
addition, a command and control system (C&C) is used to enable remote operations from a safe 
distance.  These subsystems are further detailed as follows. 
Pressurization Subsystem 
As LH2 is a very light liquid (0.591 lbs/gal), and the ET operates at lower pressures, the use of 
pumps to flow the liquid is not necessary.  Instead, the storage tank is pressurized to a nominal 
pressure of 66 PSIG for initial higher-flow operations, and subsequently lowered as the flow rate 
is decreased.  The primary components that comprise this subsystem include a main and 
auxiliary vaporizer (heat exchangers), a variable flow control valve (main) and control valves 
(main & aux).  The vaporizers are supplied LH2 from the tank separate from the cross-country 
transfer lines.  The vaporizer outlets return the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) to the top of the tank 
(reference Figure 9 - LH2 Pressurization System).  LH2 has an expansion ratio of 833:1, so 
vaporization of a relatively small amount of liquid provides an adequate gas volume that is 
compressed to pressurize the tank.  As LH2 has a boiling point below -400 degrees Fahrenheit, 
exposing the liquid to near ambient temperatures will force the evaporation necessary to generate 
tank pressure. 
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Transfer Subsystem 
The transfer subsystem consists of piping that traverses the pad and MLP and connects to the 
flight vehicle via an umbilical.  This piping is dual-walled with a vacuum maintained between 
the piping’s annular-space.  These vacuum-jacketed lines provide the insulation necessary to 
minimize the boil-off of the cryogen LH2.   
 
Figure 9 - LH2 Pressurization System 
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These cross-country transfer lines also include two valve control assemblies.  One valve complex 
is located at the base of the storage tank, and is comprised of several valves that allow both high 
and low flow rates, as well as venting capability.  The other valve complex is located on the ML 
just upstream (when loading) of the vehicle umbilical.  This valve assembly is used in 
conjunction with the pad control system to provide various flow rates during vehicle loading, and 
also supports drain operations should the launch get scrubbed for that day. 
Vent Subsystem 
As hydrogen is highly flammable, the GH2 is not allowed to be vented directly overboard from 
the vehicle during loading operations.  Instead, this vented gas is captured and routed to flare 
stacks for safe disposal.  There are four primary sources of vented GH2 as follows: 
1. The boil-off gas generated from the ET during fill operations. 
2. Within the flight vehicle, a small volume of LH2 is diverted to the engines 
to provide thermal conditioning during the loading operations.  The LH2/GH2 
from this ‘bleed’ flow is captured by the vent system. 
3. The LH2 storage tank (following pressurization). 
4. Each section of the cross-country transfer lines that can be independently 
isolated. 
The vent system includes the isolation valves for all vent sources.  The vehicle sources include 
both vehicle and ground isolation valves (vehicle valves are out-of-scope for this case study).  
The vent system also includes two flare stacks, and corresponding subsystems, that support 
burning the exhaust GH2. 
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Command and Control Subsystem 
The C&C architecture is composed of computer servers (and supporting peripheral equipment) 
within the control rooms that communicate with programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the 
vicinity of the hardware for which they control.  The operators interface with their system via 
keyboard and display(s).  The PLCs located in the field directly energize/de-energize the 
equipment based on the operator’s (or automated software) commanding.  These PLCs also 
provide instrumentation feedback for monitoring system performance.   
 
As the operation and maintenance of C&C hardware requires a different skill set than those 
performing launch vehicle loading operations, it is classified as a different subsystem from the 
LH2 subsystem under study.  Much of the C&C hardware has health and diagnostic functionality 
built into the architecture, so there are limited opportunities to augment this with additional 
value-added AD/FI technology.  This health is monitored by that subsystem when the control 
room is active.  The C&C system also impacts multiple subsystems making it difficult to limit 
the scope for this analysis.  However, it is imperative that the operators know if they are dealing 
with an issue related to their subsystem hardware as this directly influences the course of action 
going forward.  As the PLCs include numerous command or measurement cards (with less 
‘health’ capability), the PLC control system will be included in this scope. 
Existing AD/FI Capabilities 
Scoping the system includes identifying the current AD/FI capabilities already employed.  This 
information is used to disqualify potential redundant AD applications from consideration, or 
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select AD technologies intended to enhance those existing capabilities.  For the LH2 system 
under review, the primary method of anomaly detection is to bind tolerances to the 
instrumentation.  Should an exceedance occur on one of these sensors, an alarm is generated that 
alerts the operators.  This includes discrete measurements (i.e. position indicators or pressure 
switches) in which case the alarm-state is set to the opposing nominal state.  It also pertains to 
analog measurements in which specific tolerances can be set both above and below a nominal 
range.  There are no fault isolation applications used within the LH2 system.   
 
There are external AD provided by other subsystems that monitor LH2 operations.  As stated 
earlier, much of the C&C subsystem has health detection embedded within the architecture.  Any 
exceptions observed are annunciated over an audio communication network as the ability to field 
an alarm on console may be suspect.  There is also a Hazardous Gas Leak and Fire Detection 
system.  This subsystem monitors all vehicle and ground subsystems operating with hazardous 
commodities.   
Scope Overview 
The LH2 system scope for this case study can be defined as follows: 
• Pressurization subsystem to the component level 
• Transfer subsystem to the component level 
• Vent subsystem to the component level 
• C&C subsystem to PLC end items only 
o Need ability to differentiate between system vs. C&C failure 
75 
 
Existing AD/FI capabilities in which duplication is not desired include: 
• Alarm setting on system sensors 
• Health status for C&C processing components 
o Monitored by C&C subsystem 
o Limited health status for C&C end-item components (directly 
interfaces with hardware) 
• Hazardous gas leak and fire detection 
o Monitored and operated by HGLFD subsystem 
Identify and Categorize Fault Modes 
To adequately apply AD/FI techniques on the given system, the potential faults that can have 
detrimental consequences will need to be identified.  There is an assortment of methods available 
to include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and its extension Failure Mode, Effects, 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Design Review by Failure Mode (DRBFM), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and its extension Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Hazard & Operability Studies 
(HAZOP), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) among others.  The most 
predominant techniques used in industry are FMEA and FTA (Cristea & Constantinescu, 2017).   
Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis will be used to identify potential faults for this case study.  Fault trees (FTs) 
offer a graphical breakdown with regard to the hierarchy of failure modes. The base of the tree is 
called the top event and the leaves are called basic events (Adler et al., 2011).  Fault trees use a 
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top-down methodology that depicts, via a graphical representation, of how an anomaly can 
propagate through the system.  It is this propagation that may stimulate the AD/FI techniques 
employed to detect system anomalies when direct signals may not be available/adequate to alert 
the users, hence the selection of FTA. 
Fault Tree Development 
For complex systems, fault analysis is often accomplished in parallel during the design’s 
development phase.  This aids the designers with identifying critical areas that may require 
fortification, redundancy and/or additional instrumentation for visibility.  For added efficiency, a 
system engineering best-practice would then be to leverage off existing analysis.  To facilitate 
this process, such analysis would optimally be embedded within the SysML model.  The 
following depicts a method to auto-generate FTs based on the SysML model generated (Clark, 
Rabelo, & Yazici, 2017)    
 
SysML uses diagrams to portray the system.  The system’s structure is represented by Block 
Definition Diagrams (BDDs) which are intended to describe the hierarchy of the structural 
elements, or blocks.  A block can represent a single component or an entire system.  Structure is 
further defined by Internal Block Diagrams (IBDs) used to depict the how the elements within a 
block are connected and the type of matter, energy or data that flows between them.  The IBD 
provides an alternate view that can show the ‘usages’ of these blocks.  Specifically, how the parts 
are connected (and the flow that occurs between these parts) that involve the portion of the 
system within the IBD view.  For instance, a valve can be configured to an open or closed 
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position.  For a closed valve, both internal and external leakage may be a concern.  For a valve 
that is open for critical operations, internal leakage would not be a concern.  This detail is 
depicted with IBD views, so concentrating on these diagrams should result in fault associations 
based on the component functions applicable to that subsystem.  This combination of 
connectivity and flow can illustrate how a failure is distributed through a system.  Thus, it is 
conducive to providing the necessary information in developing an FT.   
 
The development of FTs for a complex system is not a trivial task.  Many of the commercial FT 
software packages will support import sheets with component data (beneficial to those with 
existing component lists within their design documentation).  However, identification of the 
relevant failure modes, linkage of components to applicable subsystems and assignment of the 
appropriate ‘gate’ is a manual process.  As most of a system’s individual components will likely 
have multiple failure modes, the number of basic events generated can far exceed the number of 
components.  As with most largely manual efforts, the input may be prone to errors, and 
omission of critical data likely to occur.  Since FTs are a graphical representation of the system, 
they are difficult to condense without undermining the readability advantage from which they are 
based.  Subsequently, traversing large FTs also presents a challenge and can hamper the reviews 
intended to find/remove such errors. 
 
The system design information embedded within an IBD (with minimal model augmentation) is 
used to auto-generate FTs.  The intent is to provide an initial FT that is all-inclusive of the 
components contained within the design, and therefore, minimize the errors and omissions that 
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may occur from manual generation.  This also reduces the effort required by the safety 
engineer(s) as it is easier to modify or prune an existing tree vs. generating one from scratch. It 
should be noted that this method does not preclude the subject matter expert’s (SME) 
involvement.  SME reviews will still be required to identify unique failures, multi-failure modes, 
system-level (non-component) and external failures.   
SysML/FT Abstraction 
As stated earlier, much of the FT development is a manual process.  Although there are 
commercial applications available that can assist with this process, the structure of an FT renders 
it unique and with minimal commonality among the numerous design models supplementing 
development.  Subsequently, there is little overlap of information to be garnered in support of 
generating FTs.  The process for constructing an FT can be summarized as follows: 
• Identify a top event and corresponding intermediate events  
• Scope the system to include all components that can contribute to the failure of 
these events 
• Generate ‘Failure Modes’ at the component level (basic events) 
• Link the events via Boolean gates to form the tree structure 
 
Although a SysML IBD too lacks all the information needed to accomplish the process above, 
much of it can be found embedded within the IBD’s design.  The remaining gaps can be filled by 
extending the SysML model.  An IBD represents a predefined block and graphically shows how 
the parts within that block interconnect (may include the flow of matter, energy or data among 
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these parts).  These blocks can characterize the entire system, the various subsystems, component 
assemblies, components and even the component makeup if that is the level of detail desired by 
the stakeholders.   As is typical for most MBSE methods, the system is first defined at a high-
level.  This broadly defined system is then decomposed into subsystems, an iterative process that 
continues until the desired level of detail is achieved.  Therefore, a developed SysML model will 
contain IBDs that denote the system structure at all levels of the project.   
 
The 1st step in FT auto-generation is identifying the top event, followed by the applicable 
intermediate events.  This is accomplished by simply using the IBD frame title as this should 
accurately reflect the subsystem’s functionality (assuming modeling best-practices employed). 
  
The next step is to scope the system to ensure all applicable components are included.  As the 
IBDs illustrate the system’s design structure, they also define the system scope.  All parts within 
the IBD that have failure modes identified will be included in the FT. 
 
Creditable failure modes must be determined for each component within the IBD.  These modes 
will be used to identify the basic events for the FT.  This is information that is not readily 
available within a SysML project, and therefore must be added to the model.  A block can be 
used to define the various failure modes, though for large projects, the user may want to create a 
specific stereotyped element to represent these modes.  To create the failure modes for the initial 
FT, first categorize the components into common classifications.  For instance, an ‘indicator’ 
class may include pressure transducers, temperature transducers, flowmeters, etc.  For each 
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component class, list the generic failure modes that applicable to that class.  Generic failure 
modes for a valve-class may include: 
• Valve fails open 
• Valve fails closed  
• Valve position unknown 
• Valve leaks externally 
• Valve leaks internally 
Note too that failure modes may be applicable to multiple component classes (i.e. ‘leaks 
externally’).  Generating component classes results in a much smaller subset of failure modes 
compared to the overall component base.  Subsequently, the SysML model updates to 
accomplish this step are minimal, compared to embedding this information within all the 
component blocks. 
 
The last step for FT development is to link events via Boolean gates to form the tree’s structure.  
Linkage is already established between the top level of the localized FT (IBD title) and the parts 
contained within the IBD.  However, a connection must be made between the components and 
failure modes added to the model.  This can be accomplished by allocating failure modes to their 
corresponding component classes.  SysML specifies the use of ‘allocations’ as a means of 
crosscutting the model and linking (integrating) the various model elements.  An allocation 
simply reflects that if a change occurs to the ‘supplier’ side, a change may be needed on the 
‘client’ side, thus it represents a dependency of the clients to their supplier (“OMGSysML-v1.4-
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15-06-03.pdf,” n.d.).  Allocation also allows for easy selection/deselection of the generic failure 
modes as not all will be applicable in every component instance.  
 
A Boolean gate must also be inserted between each level of events.  NASA’s Fault Tree 
Handbook with Aerospace Applications defines a “state of component” failure as one that is 
localized to a component (all other failures are deemed “state of system”) and that state-of-
component failures should always utilize OR gates (Stamatelatos et al., 2002).  This simplifies 
the gate selection between the components and the failure modes as all will be OR gates.  
However, the gates between the localized top event (likely a subsystem event) and corresponding 
component levels may utilize either an AND or an OR gate.  For instance, both primary and 
secondary valves (redundant flow path) must fail for the system to fail.  This relationship is FT 
modeled with an AND gate.  This needs to be noted as that information is not readily embedded 
within the IBD or within the failure modes added to the model.  Therefore, it needs to be 
addressed to maximize the integrity of the initial FT.  The example that follows provides one 
method to accomplish this before FT auto-generation takes place. 
Example 
This section will provide an example of FT auto-generation.  It uses an IBD that depicts the 
liquid hydrogen (LH2) storage tank pressurization subsystem (reference Figure 10 - 
IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys.  This system pressurizes an LH2 storage tank which enabled LH2 
flow to the Space Shuttle’s external tank.  The last bracketed term in the IBD frame is 
‘LH2StorTankPressSys.’  This is the top-level (subsystem) event for this IBD, and will later be 
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appended with “_Fails” as events should reflect the issue under analysis.  All the parts within this 
IBD will make up the subsequent intermediate levels. 
 
The 1st step in extending the SysML model is to add the generic failure modes.  For this example, 
failure modes have been produced for the component classes applicable to this IBD only.  They 
ibd [block] LH2StorTankPressSys [LH2StorTankPressSys]     
PneuToPneuCntrl: 
CNTRL-Pneu-1
StorTankPress: IND-
Press-6
LH2Storage: TNK-LH2-1
Vaporizer: VAP-1[1..2]
VapOutCheck: 
VLV-Chk-8[1..2]
SigPressIN
MainVapFlowCntrl: 
VLV-Cntrl-1
MainVapSO: VLV-Pneu-
17
AuxVapCntrl: VLV-
Pneu-18
: GH2
: LH2
«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» GH2
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» Pressure
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» GH2
«itemFlow»
«ValueType» GH2
«itemFlow»
Figure 10 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys 
83 
 
have been created as blocks and added to a package titled ‘FailureModes’ where they can be 
accessed from the model repository (reference Figure 11 - Model Repository Example). 
 
With inclusion of the failure modes, they can now be allocated to applicable components.  The 
parts within the system where initially generated as ‘blocks.’  However, these blocks can have 
multiple instances within a system, and each of those instances may have different functions.  
When an instance of a component block is used within an IBD, it is categorized as a part- 
Figure 11 - Model Repository Example 
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property.  As the applicable failure modes may differ based on how that part is used, the failure 
modes should be linked to the individual part properties.  This can be done via SysML diagrams 
and the corresponding tool’s drawing features (reference Figure 12 – ‘FailureMode’ to Part 
BDD).   
 
If a stakeholder need for a diagram view of these allocations is not required, then it is 
recommended that a Relationship Matrix be used.  The SysML standard does promote the use of 
matrices, but does not standardized their use.  Therefore, the functionality of matrices can differ 
bdd [package] FaultTreeLinks [FailModeToProp_Vlv]     
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsClosed
VLV_MainVapSO
(from 
LH2StorTankPressSys)
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvLeaksInt
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvLeaksExt
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvPosUnknown
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsOpen
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsPartially
«allocate»«allocate»«allocate»
«allocate» «allocate» «allocate»
Figure 12 – ‘FailureMode’ to Part BDD 
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between the tools.  A matrix enables easy selection/deselection for both individual and multiple 
blocks, and it also captures the IBD structure that is used to generate the FT (reference Figure 13 
- Relationship Matrix).   
 
 
As noted earlier, the IBD does not readily signal which Boolean gate should be used at the 
component level.  This is typically determined by analysis (and SysML is accommodating with 
inclusion of such data).  However, using a matrix from which to build an FT does limit the 
information that can be embedded.  To diminish the need to make such modifications after the 
Figure 13 - Relationship Matrix 
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FT is generated, the following method was employed.  Two ‘AND’ blocks were included in the 
model repository for failure modes.  These blocks are intended to associate any AND conditions 
for the components within that IBD.  It needs to be stated that this usage of blocks does not 
enhance the SysML model (and the element descriptions should be annotated accordingly).  
Lacking a standard that aligns SysML with FT generation, this simply provides a means to 
transfer information for external use.  The IBD contains ‘main’ and ‘auxiliary’ vaporizer control 
valves.  These should be reflected with an AND gate, and the Relationship matrix has been 
annotated accordingly.   
 
The tool used for this example (Sparx’s Enterprise Architect) has the capability to export a 
relationship matrix in a ‘.csv’ format.  The following steps outline the process for building an FT 
from the matrix.  For this example, the ‘.csv’ file was imported into Excel.  A VBA macro was 
written that performs the following steps to auto-generate the FT (OR and AND gates are shown 
textually) (reference Figure 16 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT): 
1) Save the .csv file using the IBD name.  Append “_Fails” to the file name and use 
this as the top event. 
a. Place an OR gate below this event 
2) For the next level, add all the components that are not allocated in the matrix to an 
AND block (target).  Append each component name with “_Fails.” 
a. Connect these events to the OR gate from the top level. 
b. Place an OR gate below the component intermediate events. 
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3) If applicable:  For those components intended for AND gates (target), create a 
new intermediate event (remains at the same level as the component OR gates).  Event 
title to be composed of component names, and appended with ‘_Fail.’  
a. Connect the events to the OR gate from the top level. 
b. Place an AND gate below these component events. 
c. Add a new level for those components linked to AND gates.  Append each 
component name with “_Fails.” 
i. Connect these events to the corresponding AND gate(s). 
ii. Place an OR gate below these component events. 
4) For all component events, add a new lower level with the corresponding failure 
modes (source).  
a. Connect these events to the OR gates at the inetermediate level(s).  
b. Place a circle below the failure mode events (denotes a basic event). 
  
  
/
|
|
|
|    / | | | |     \
| | | | | | |
| | | |
|    ⃝ |    ⃝ |    ⃝ |
|
|    ⃝    ⃝    ⃝
/ \
| |
   / | | | |     \    / | | | |     \
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | |
   ⃝ |    ⃝ |    ⃝ |    ⃝ |    ⃝ |    ⃝ |
   ⃝    ⃝    ⃝    ⃝    ⃝    ⃝
VLV_AuxVap and MainVap_Failed
AND
VlvFailsOpen VlvLeaksExt VlvPosUnknown
VLV_MainVapFlowCntrl_Failed
OR
|
|
VlvFailsClosed VlvFailsPartially VlvLeaksInt
VlvFailsOpen VlvLeaksExt VlvPosUnknown
OR
|
|
VlvFailsClosed VlvFailsPartially VlvLeaksInt
|
|
|
OR
LH2StorTankPressSys2_Failed
|
|
OR
VLV_MainVapSO_Failed
|
\
VlvFailsClosed
VlvFailsOpen
VlvFailsPartially
VlvLeaksExt
VlvLeaksInt
VlvPosUnknown
VLV_AuxVapCntrl_Failed
Figure 14 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT 
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As shown in Figure 14 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT), an FT can be generated with 
minimal extension of SysML to include the basis events (failure modes) and the structure 
internal to an IBD.  Although there are limitations with the amount of information that can be 
transferred in a matrix, the following lists the advantages of generating FTs directly from the 
SysML model: 
• Minimizes SME assistance for initial FT construction 
o SMEs  develop the IBDs so this expertise is propagated to initial FTs 
o Stakeholder’s IBD design review updates also transmitted to FTs 
• Initial FT all-encompassing (component level) with inclusion of components identified 
within the SysML design 
o It is easier to prune or modify an existing FT than build from   
• Relationship matrix provides an easy method to add/delete prior to FT generation  
• FT organization consistent with SysML model (IBDs) 
o SysML updates transmitted to FTs 
• Linkage between systems and potential failure modes collected in SysML model to 
support other analysis 
Fault Tree Auto-Generation Limitations 
The primary limitation is the depth or layering of the components within the IBD.  With a two-
dimensional matrix from which the data is transferred, capturing multiple levels of sub tiered 
systems and components within the IBD cannot be accomplished for FT development.  Inserting 
multiple levels into an IBD can increase the complexity of that view, and subsequently, be 
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counter-productive to its readability.  Modelers may minimize this practice, but it should not be 
restricted.  For this method to be successful, multi-level IBDs must be further decomposed when 
encountered.  Therefore, implementing this technique has the potential to drive IBD design.  
Identify and Categorize Sensor Data 
The sensors convey the operational status of a remotely controlled system.  As such, a sensor can 
be defined as a component that provides feedback to the operator on the status of the system via 
the command and control architecture.  They are the only means of providing an operator the 
visibility to determine the state of a monitored system.  Therefore, the sensor array is the primary 
mechanism that can restrict and/or enhance the insight into system performance.  System health 
and status is typically derived from sensors directly measuring a specific function, as well as a 
combination of indirect measurements that may have influence over that portion of the 
subsystem.   
 
As the sensor array allows the system to be observed, it is very important to identify all the 
sensors available within the system.  This information will be used to refine the fault tree 
developed for this system as the availability of measurements will influence the granularity of 
the failure modes detected.  If the fault tree has identified failure modes that the existing sensors 
provide limited visibility and cannot reasonably detect, then it is not practical to expect an AD 
system to overcome this deficiency.  However, a couple of insights should be noted.  First, 
supplement AD systems are expected to be ‘smart,’ and perhaps capable of detecting issues with 
limited indications in ways that may not appear obvious to an observer.  Second, if the (limited-
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visibility) failure mode is credible and has potentially serious consequences, then the correct 
course of action may be a sensor modification to the system that facilitates detection of that 
failure mode.  
 
The sensor array will be the primary factor in resolving the failure modes identified by the fault 
tree to those in consideration for the framework.  For those components that have some degree of 
sensor oversight, criticality will be assumed (and assumed non-critical if sensor visibility is 
lacking).  If indicator granularity can only provide insight to a subassembly level, then the 
corresponding failure mode will only be identified to this level.  
 
In the preliminary framework described in chapter 4, a matrix was proposed to identify and 
categorize the sensor array (reference Table 4: Failures vs. Instrument Matrix).  This matrix 
would relate the potential faults to the system’s available measurements.  In addition, the method 
applied would annotate if that measurement was a direct or indirect means of detecting the fault.  
This implementation would initially aid in reducing the potential faults being considered if it 
could be determined adequate instrumentation was not available to uncover those issues. 
 
For this case study, the means to identify and categorize the sensors will instead build upon the 
current model (a systems engineering best practice).  Relationship matrixes are fully available 
within SysML, and can be generated and modified using a matrix format, or graphically within 
the various SysML diagrams.  Furthermore, the auto FT generator technique embedded the 
applicable faults within the model structure making them readily available to associate with other 
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model elements.  The following will leverage off these existing faults to illustrate this 
development task supporting the framework. 
 
When developing a SysML model, a ‘parts list’ is generated in the process of identifying the 
system structure.  This is done by first creating Block Definition Diagrams (BDDs) depicting 
higher level structure, and then decomposing this system structure until the individual 
components are identified.  Building off an accessible list within the model is not only efficient, 
but has the ability to capture additional associations which further develops the underlying 
structure of the model. 
 
In addition to stand-alone instruments added to measure a given part of a system, indicators are 
also embedded within components to provide status for that component.  The most common 
application for this case study are valves that are ‘switched’ to provide feedback to that valve’s 
open, closed or intermediate position.  These indicators can provide discrete data such as a limit-
switches that are placed so that they get ‘depressed’ when a valve reaches a given position (i.e. 
open/closed).  A component may have 1 or more indicators to determine its position (reference 
Figure 15 – BDD of Remote Valve with 1 or 2 Limit Switches).  They can also be potentiometer 
type indicators that provide an analog signal for variable position valves. 
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Figure 15 – BDD of Remote Valve with 1 or 2 Limit Switches 
 
An association between indicators and faults they could potentially detect could be made.  
However, the majority of the indicators will have some degree of detection for most fault modes 
which would result in a matrix that is mostly ‘filled-in.’ In addition, the process of assigning 
indicators to faults could result in leaving out measurements that may have some unique way of 
uncovering an issue.  As this framework is intended to apply new technologies to many systems, 
implementing a method that predetermines which sensors are applicable to which faults can be 
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counterproductive.  Subsequently, a method that readily identifies and categorizes all types of 
measurements will suffice.  
 
For this case study, all stand-alone indicator components are assigned part numbers prefixed with 
“IND_,” and located in an Indicator package (embedded within a Component List package).  A 
BDD was created to organize and show temperature indicators (reference Figure 16 - BDD 
Containing Temperature Indicators).  To categorize the sensors, a package can be created for 
each type of indicator inclusive to that system.  This method provides both a parts list of all 
indicators inclusive to the system as well as a means to quickly find that item within the 
diagrams so that the instrument’s functionality can also be determined.   
 
Figure 16 - BDD Containing Temperature Indicators 
 
The parts list comprised of BDDs will show all the components used within a system, and if 
desired, how many of each of those components are used.  The fault tree development process 
addresses indicator failures.  This section considers the need for associating indicator 
bdd [package] Indicator [IND-Temp]     
«block»
IND-Temp-9
«block»
IND-Temp-1
«block»
IND-Temp-2
«block»
IND-Temp-3
«block»
IND-Temp-4
«block»
IND-Temp-5
«block»
IND-Temp-6
«block»
IND-Temp-7
94 
 
components to faults that they may detect as proposed within the initial framework.  The goal 
here was to use this information to help bound the number of credible faults to address only 
those for which there is visibility.  As stated above, linking indicators within an IBD to potential 
faults they may detect will likely result in and association for nearly all (if not all) faults-to-
indicators.  As an alternative, the association can be made at the BDD level, but this too could 
produce an outcome of the same result in using the IBDs.  These indicator BDDs will be the 
means for identifying the system sensors and categorizing their attributes.      
Identify and Categorize AD/FI Applications 
The next step in this case study is to identify the AD/FI applications that should be considered 
for implementation.  This pre-selection process should be driven primarily by the project’s 
requirements.  As there are numerous applications and techniques available, a significant amount 
of time can be spent researching all the possibilities which is not necessarily a practical 
approach.  To reduce this effort, AD/FI classes are identified in which the technologies are 
similar.  The onus for testing the various apps belongs to the users/stakeholders, though this 
framework assists with the selection process. 
Requirements 
One of the primary objectives of building a system model is having the ability to generate 
requirements, and then readily track implementation of those requirements through the system’s 
life cycle.  This capability is requisite within the systems engineering discipline, and SysML 
provides this functionality by providing a requirements diagram.  This diagram works with text-
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based requirements in that it can show relationships among the assorted requirements, other 
model elements and external objects (analysis, drawings, etc.) identified within the model.  There 
are various notations available that provide traceability of these relationships.  A requirement 
block (with associations) can also be dropped on other diagrams when it benefits the 
stakeholders to have this visibility and corresponding relationships.   
Mission Statement 
Requirements are typically generated at a higher level, and then broken down into lower level 
requirements as the design takes shape.  For the LH2 system, a Mission Statement is created that 
describes what the system will accomplish.  This statement is parsed to derive the initial upper 
level requirements for the system design.  A requirements diagram is developed titled Mission 
Statement Requirements (reference Figure 17 – Mission Statement/Requirements Diagram).  
This diagram includes requirements ‘contained’ within the mission statement (those linked with 
a plus within a circle in the figure).  These are the higher-level requirements that will be 
decomposed to system level ones that drive the design.  In figure xx, a derived requirement 
necessitating AD/FD capabilities was added subordinate to the ‘Safe Operations’ requirement.   
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Mission Requirements 
With a requirement embedded in the Mission Needs Statement that dictates AD/FI capabilities, 
the mission requirements can now be developed.  These are, for the most part, functional 
requirements in that they qualitatively define what is expected of the AD/FI applications.  These 
requirements will drive the AD/FI technology to apply to the system.  At this point, requirements 
req [package] Mission Needs Statement [Mission Statement Requirements]     
«requirement»
LH2 Transfer System
id = "MS-1.1.2"
text = "Will transfer LH2 from
storage tank to vehicle."
«requirement»
Automate Operations
id = "MS-2.1"
text = "Remote loading
operations are
automated."
«requirement»
Control Room 
id = "MS-2.2"
text = "Remote operations
take place in a control
room."
«requirement»
Remote Operations
id = "MS-2"
text = "Fill operations are
performed remotely."
«requirement»
Safe Operations
id = "MS-3"
text = "System has to operate
safely for both nominal and off-
nominal operations."
«requirement»
Stor Tank Press System
id = "MS-1.1.1"
text = "Storage tank
pressurization will allow for
varying flow rates."
«requirement»
Fill Launch Vehicles
id = "MS-1"
text = "LH2 storage tank used to
fill space launch vehicles."
«requirement»
Flow LH2
id = "MS-1.1"
text = "Ground and vehicle
systems result in back
pressure when trying to load
the vehicle."
The Mission Statement (MS) 
requirements are parsed from the 
Mission Needs Statement. These are 
high-level requirements and form the 
base that directs the system design.
«requirement»
Mission Needs Statement
id = "MS-0"
text = "A mission needs statement will be
developed to describe the higher-level needs for
which a system design will be developed."
«requirement»
Anomaly Detection/Fault 
Isolation
id = "3.1"
text = "Provide anomaly
detection and fault
isolation capabilities"
«requirement»
Vent System
id = "3.2"
text = "Vent system to
provide safe disposal of
hydrogen gas generated
during loading."
«deriveReqt» «deriveReqt»
«deriveReqt»
Figure 17 – Mission Statement/Requirements Diagram 
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can be decomposed that are specific towards covering the desired subsystems.  Note that 
requirements that focus on an explicit scenario may limit the available applications to consider.  
Since there are many technologies available including some that work indirectly with available 
data, the initial mission requirements should address overall AD/FI desires along with the 
operator’s interface.  A Mission Requirements (AD-FI) diagram was generated to collect and 
organize the AD/FI requirements (reference Figure 18 - Mission Requirements).  It is at this level 
that the requirements will be used for selecting the potential AD/FI application(s) for 
consideration.  After the selection process is completed, these requirements can be further 
decomposed to start showing implementation details for the system design. 
 
req [package] Mission Requirements [Mission Requirements AD-FI]     
«requirement»
Anomaly 
Detection/Fault 
Isolation
(from Mission Needs 
Statement)
«requirement»
Provide Anomaly 
Detection Capability
«requirement»
Provide Fault Isolation 
Capability
«requirement»
Have means to notify 
(alarm) the operator
«requirement»
Have a high level of 
detection accuracy
«requirement»
Minimizes false alarms
«requirement»
Provide real-time 
monitoring of system
«requirement»
Have ability to analyze 
post-test data
«requirement»
Have ability to adjust 
sensitivity of detection
«requirement»
Have means to notify the 
operator
«requirement»
List all potential faulty 
components
«requirement»
List in order of fault 
probability
«requirement»
Have ability to limit list 
to most-probable
«requirement»
Minimize cost
«deriveReqt»
«deriveReqt»«deriveReqt»
Figure 18 - Mission Requirements 
98 
 
A ‘minimize cost’ requirement was included with the mission requirements.  As cost is always a 
major factor in system design, it is important to include cost factors in the prescreening process.  
A diagram is included that decomposes the cost requirement and provides additional detail as to 
how costs will be controlled (reference Figure 19 - Requirements AD-FI Diagram). 
Effectiveness Requirements 
Effectiveness requirements provide a means to measure the system’s functional capabilities 
against the expectations of the design.  Developing effectiveness AD/FI requirements can be 
quite challenging.  Typically, a requirement is developed to meet a desired objective.  As the 
design takes into consideration the operating environment, an expectation of how the system will 
req [package] Requirements AD-FI [Requirements AD-FI]     
«requirement»
Minimize cost
(from Mission 
Requirements)
«requirement»
Existing Application
«requirement»
Minimal Development
«requirement»
Minimize Number of 
Applications
«requirement»
Minimize Supporting 
Applications
«requirement»
Use Existing Data
«requirement»
Use Existing Hardware
«deriveReqt»
«deriveReqt»«deriveReqt»
Figure 19 - Requirements AD-FI Diagram 
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perform is rendered.  Effectiveness requirements bring about ways to measure this performance.  
The difficulty posed by dealing with anomalies is that systems are not (purposely) designed to 
fail.  Failures can occur for a variety of reasons to include component/material failure, 
operation/environment excursions, design flaws, operator error, etc.  Some failures will have an 
immediate impact on system performance while others may slowly degrade before they reach a 
point that is detrimental to operations.   How a failure propagates thru the system can differ 
based on the severity of the failure and the system configuration supporting the current process.  
Fault trees are used to identify various failure modes, but the same failure may present itself 
entirely different to the operators.  For a complex system, it is unreasonable to wholly catalog the 
number of abnormal conditions that may arise and how the instrumentation will respond with 
certainty for all phases of operations.  This means there are many ‘unknowns’ (which is, of 
course, the rationale for applying AD/FI technology).  Subsequently, trying to measure the 
effectiveness in detecting this unknown can be challenging.  
 
By identifying both functional and cost-related requirements, enough information is provided to 
select which classes of AD/FI applications should be pursued.  These requirements remain high-
level so as not to constrain the initial selection process too tightly.  They are summarized below 
(reference Table 5 – Requirement Summary). 
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AD-FI Initial Selection 
Classes of both AD and FI applications/technology have been previously identified.  These 
classes attempt to group individual techniques utilizing common methodology.  This framework 
Req ID Title Description
AD-1 Provide Anomaly Detection Capability Overall requirement to provide AD capability
AD-1.1 Have means to notify (alarm) the operator Provide a means to notify operator of exceptions (via existing 
C&C architecture or stand-alone system available to operators)
AD-1.2 Have a high level of detection accuracy Have ability to accurately detect issues above existing AD 
capabilities
AD-1.3 Minimizes false alarms Minimizes nuisance-alarms that detract operators from system 
monitoring 
AD-1.4 Have ability to analyze post-test data Have ability to 'playback' data for post-test data reviews
AD-1.4.1 Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection Have ability to increase the sensitivity of post-test runs so all 
exceptions are addressed (both nominal/off-nominal)
AD-1.5 Provide real-time monitoring of system Provide real-time AD monitoring during operations
FI-1 Provide Fault Isolation Capability Overall requirement to provide FI capability
FI-1.1 Have means to notify the operator Provide a means to notify operator of exceptions (via existing 
C&C architecture or stand-alone system available to operators)
FI-1.2 List all potential faulty components When more than 1 potential source of an issue is possible, list all 
possibilities 
FI-1.2.1 Have ability to limit list to most-probable When listing all possibilities, have the ability to limit what is 
displayed (no scrolling pages)
FI-1.2.2 List in order of fault probability When listing multiple issues, rank in order of probability and 
display in this order
ADFI-1 Minimize cost (AD/FI) Overall requirement to minimize ADFI costs
ADFI-1.1 Minimal Development Minimize overall development related to adding ADFI 
technology
ADFI-1.1.1 Use Existing Data Use existing data already available to support applications (i.e. 
system empirical data, existing models, etc).
ADFI-1.1.2 Use Existing Hardware Use existing system instrumentation and C&C architecture 
(mimimize system modifications)
ADFI-1.2 Existing Application Use existing AD and/or FI applications either commercially 
available or mature in development process
ADFI-1.3 Minimize Number of Applications Minimize the number of aumented applications to meet 
requirements
ADFI-1.3.1 Minimize Supporting Applications Use only existing models or applications necessary to 
supplement ADFI applications
Table 5 – Requirement Summary 
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will first distinguish which classes have the potential to meet requirements, and then focus on 
advancing these.  These classes include: 
• Anomaly Detectors 
o Nearest Neighbor/Clustering Algorithms  
o Neural Network 
o Statistical/Parametric 
o One-Class Support Vector Machines 
• Fault Isolators 
o Physics Model 
o Expert Systems 
o Fault Map Model 
Anomaly Detection 
For AD, there are several existing techniques used for detecting LH2 system problems.  These 
include limit-setting, data plotting, software notifications and system video views.  The use of 
cameras to scan and monitor the physical system provides very limited AD capability.  However, 
they have occasionally detected vapor clouds generated by cryogenic leaks in areas that do not 
have leak detection instrumentation.   
 
Limit-setting allows the operators to set alarms above and/or below analog measurements, as 
well as opposing states for discrete measurements.  Limits can be set on all measurements and 
modified as required when the system transitions to different phases.  This provides an overall 
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level of protection that goes well beyond a small subset of measurements that can be viewed at a 
given time by the operator.  As the alarms are set just inside the operational (or design) 
specifications, they can provide notification prior to an exceedance for issues that do not 
immediately initiate/propagate to unacceptable levels.  This remains the predominant method for 
detecting system anomalies.  The application software for controlling the system has additional 
AD functionality.  Most valves have a design specification that identifies a maximum amount of 
time a valve should cycle to its opposite state when operating nominally.  The software monitors 
all valve cycles, and displays the valve timing.  If this exceeds specified values, and alarm is 
generated. 
 
Another existing AD method is the ability to plot system data real-time (this capability was not 
available in Shuttle until approximately half-way through the program).  Operators could select 
related data and plot these indicators on a single display.  This provided a graphical view of 
performance over time vs. a ‘snapshot’ view provided by system displays.  These plots made it 
easy to spot data trends that started to diverge from ‘nominal.’  This proved to be valuable at 
times as some anomalies could be seen developing long before an alarm was triggered.  This 
provides additional time for an operator to respond which is highly desirable in time-critical and 
hazardous operations. 
 
103 
 
AD Application Rankings 
The AD applications under consideration are all data-driven detection techniques.  This can be 
expected for a couple of reasons.  First, this is an existing system with a mature design.  So 
anomaly detection hardware (additional sensors) should already be embedded within the system.  
There is a cost component to consider as modifying the system can be costly.  Since the existing 
sensor array met the original design requirements, adding additional sensors or detection 
hardware may not be considered unless a potential (and credible) failure mode is uncovered with 
severe consequences.  For this case study, this is also reflected in a cost-related requirement that 
dictates no additional hardware.  Since modifying the system is not typically a viable option, 
then the other option is to focus on the data that the system produces.  This data is relatively 
cheap and readily available.  Based on the literature, researches are finding unique ways to yield 
additional information from this data. 
 
For remote systems, operators monitor displays to ensure indications remain within specified 
parameters.  Not every measurement can be found on a display, and a very limited number of 
displays can be viewed concurrently.  Subsequently, the operator’s overall visibility of the 
system is very restricted.  A limit-setting application compensates for this handicap by 
monitoring all measurements and notifying the operator of exceedances by means of an alarm.  
When data plotting (real-time) became available, operator recognition of deviations from 
nominal trends became more discernible.  This provided a way to detect failures that were 
developing, but had not yet triggered an alarm.  Again, the operator is constrained by a lack of 
visibility into the overall system.  The data-driven models all work to distinguish between 
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nominal and off-nominal data.  Having an application that can monitor a system and detect when 
data points transition from normal-to-anomaly extends this ability beyond the visible plots, just 
as the limit-setting application did for tolerance violations. 
 
The AD functional requirements are intended to provide a higher-level detail as to what is 
desired without overly restricting the potential AD candidate field.  There are a couple of 
requirements (can alarm, adds value over existing AD) that direct general necessities.  There are 
also a couple of performance ones written qualitatively (detection accuracy, minimize false 
alarms).  These may be later be decomposed to provide specific values that the application(s) 
will need to meet.  The remainder of the requirements address specific functions that are sought 
after to support the LH2 system.  These include: 
• Provide real-time monitoring of system  
o The application must be able to function in a real-time environment.  This is a tool 
used to augment AD and should be available when time-critical decisions are 
required.  This can also be difficult to implement if the underlying algorithm has a 
high level of computational complexity.  The LH2 system will have hundreds of 
indicators reporting at a sample rate of 10 per second 
• Have ability to analyze post-test data  
o The application should not only work real-time, but also be able to playback test 
data.  All vehicle loadings require a post-test data review looking for irregular 
events.  This is accomplished while not time-critical.  It should be noted that if the 
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post test data reviews show nominal operations, that data set then gets added to 
the training data used for subsequent operations 
• Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection 
o As the application is intended to support both real-time and post-test analysis, it 
should allow for adjusting the sensitivity.  Being able to desensitize the 
application during real-time operations should limit the concern that a high 
number of false alarms will just distract the operators.  Post-test reviews are very 
thorough as they account for every unexpected data point.  A highly sensitive tool 
will better support this effort. 
• Functions in multi-phasing and transient operations 
o Much of the literature uses examples of where a system is operating, perhaps with 
numerous dynamics involved (i.e. rocket engine runs), but it does so in a 
relatively stable operational and/or configuration setting.  This is not the case for 
loading the vehicle with cryogenic fluids.  There are multiple phases to load a 
vehicle and each requires a change in configuration.  When using limit-settings 
and a transition is required, the applicable limits are inhibited.  Once the transition 
is complete, the limits are again activated to the changed levels that support the 
new phase.  The AD application needs to be versatile enough to accommodate the 
various phases.  It is also desirable to monitor the system transients as limit-
setting is inhibited at this time leaving only visual display monitoring for issue 
detection. 
 
106 
 
As budget is often a major factor in determining if a project goes forward, cost requirements are 
needed to ensure investment does not exceed the value-added.  As this technology tends to be 
customized towards user with unique purposes, there are very few commercial applications 
readily available.  Therefore, developing an application to meet requirements is a possibility.  
This also means estimating the project cost is much more difficult as there many unknown 
variables at this point in the life-cycle.  Subsequently, the cost requirements are written such they 
minimize development, implementation and maintenance costs associated with a new 
application.  This is an indirect way of controlling costs associated with the ambiguity 
surrounding new development. 
 
A matrix was developed showing both requirements and AD classes (reference Table 6 - 
Requirement/AD-Class Matrix).  This uses a simple scoring system to rank the AD classes.  It 
does give partial credit if it is known that at least some of the requirement can be satisfied or if it 
is unknown if it can be satisfied at all.  This is intended to lower the scores for those classes that 
require additional research without ruling them out completely by scoring ‘does not meet.’  The 
requirement/AD-class were scored as follows: 
• 0=Does Not Meet Requirement 
• 1=Partially Meets Requirement or Unknown 
• 2=Meets Requirement 
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Within the functional requirements, the applications scored very closely.  As these are all data-
driven techniques, this is not unexpected.  The basic difference between the classes is how they 
determine data is normal or anomalous.  Therefore, the ability to meet functional requirements 
should be similar.  For the performance related requirements, it is unknown if they can be met so 
Title
Nearest Neighbor/Clustering 
Neural Network
Statistical/Param
etric
One-Class SVM
s
Have means to notify (alarm) the operator 2 2 2 2
Have a high level of detection accuracy 1 1 1 1
Minimizes false alarms 1 1 1 1
Have ability to analyze post-test data 2 2 2 2
Provide real-time monitoring of system 2 1 1 1
Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection 2 2 2 2
Functions in multi-phasing and transient ops 1 1 1 1
Adds value above existing AD capabilities 1 1 1 1
Totals: 12 11 11 11
Minimal Development 2 1 1 1
Uses Existing Data 2 2 2 2
Uses Existing Hardware 2 2 2 2
Existing Application 2 1 1 1
Minimize Number of Applications 1 1 1 1
Minimize Supporting Applications 1 1 1 1
Totals: 10 8 8 8
Grand Totals: 22 19 19 19
Minimize Cost (AD/FI)
Provide Anomaly Detection Capability
Table 6 - Requirement/AD-Class Matrix 
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these too are comparably scored.  However, there is an exception within the Nearest-
Neighbor/Clustering class.  NASA has developed an AD application called Inductive Monitoring 
System (IMS) (“Inductive Monitoring System,” n.d.).  They have licensed this technology on a 
non-exclusive basis in that it will be made available for use in NASA applications.  As this 
application is being used in industry and supporting real-time applications, it will be assumed it 
can meet the real-time requirement.  Although the literature is generally favorable in the 
detection capabilities for all the AD classes, these were specific cases that are not necessarily 
common to the LH2 system.  Subsequently, requirements related to detection skills are rated 
‘unknown.’ 
 
As IMS is an existing application ready to adapt to a given system, it will require less 
development as the core algorithm is already functional.  This advantage gives the Nearest-
Neighbor/Clustering class a favorable ranking for the cost related requirements.  Therefore, a 
down-selection will be made at this time to pursue a Clustering application.  However, as the 
ability of this application to function well within the LH2 system remains unknown, further 
analysis will be required. 
FI Application Rankings 
There are three classes identified related to FI.  The first is a physics model.  It is presumed that 
the model can mimic system operations, and if the system goes off-nominal, the model can be 
adapted to determine why.  The second method involves an expert system.  Such a system 
involves developing a knowledgebase, and then uses this information to follow a path that leads 
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to the root cause of the issue.  It does this by incrementally performing a series of tests.  The 
result of each test determines which test is next applied.  The third class is termed a fault map 
model.  This technique also develops a knowledgebase that maps the individual failures to the 
sensors used to detect that failure. 
 
A complex system will have a very large number of potential failures.  Often, a failure will 
propagate through the system further disrupting performance and possibly creating additional 
failures.  As this propagation is dependent on system configuration, and this often changes for 
the LH2 system, it is not easily predictable.  With a large number of potential failures, 
propagation unpredictability and a sensor array that provides a limited view of the system, 
isolating the issue to a specific component cannot always be accomplished during remote 
operations.  Therefore, an FI application should be able to list multiple possible failure modes. 
 
The LH2 system is composed of approximately 2,500 labeled components (this does not include 
piping, wiring, fittings structural components that also comprise the system).  As shown during 
fault tree development, each component can have multiple failures.  As each of the FI classes 
under consideration need this information to function, generating the applicable knowledgebase 
will be labor intense.  In addition, relating these failures (and propagation) to the instrumentation 
that detects them requires system expert knowledge.   
 
The FI functional requirements are intended to provide a higher-level detail as to what is desired 
without restricting options as with the AD functional requirements.  These requirements include: 
110 
 
• Have means to notify the operator 
o The application needs to display results to the operator.  This can be an automated 
report (triggered from an alarm) or a manual request by the operator.  This 
application can run embedded within the existing C&C architecture, or from a 
standalone platform. 
• List all potential faulty components 
o As it is unlikely that an FI application will be able to settle on a definitive 
problem, all suspect issues should be displayed to the operators.   
• Have ability to limit list to most-probable 
o When displaying multiple issues, the operator should have the means to limit the 
displayed items.  This protects against a failure (i.e. major C&C component) that 
can generate hundreds of alarms, and subsequently, hundreds of potential faults 
(limits scrolling pages). 
• List in order of fault probability 
o When displaying multiple issues, order the list so that ‘most-likely’ items are 
shown first.  This requires a means to assign a probability score to the possible 
fault causes. 
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The cost-related requirements used for AD ranking were developed to minimize development 
costs, and these same requirements apply to the FI applications.  A matrix was generated to rank 
the FI classes using the same 0-2 scoring method (reference Table 7 - Requirement/IF-Class 
Matrix). 
 
The FI classes scored closely for the functional requirements with the only advantage given to 
Fault Map Models.  There is an existing application called TEAMS-RT that has been tested in 
other NASA applications (“TEAMS-RT,” n.d.).  This model does have the ability to rank the 
suspect faults detected.  It is unknown if the other classes can include this feature. 
Title
Phsics M
odel
Expert System
Fault M
ap M
odel
Have means to notify the operator 2 2 2
List all potential faulty components 1 1 1
Have ability to limit list to most-probable 2 2 2
List in order of fault probability 1 1 2
Totals: 6 6 7
Minimal Development 1 1 1
Uses Existing Data 2 2 2
Uses Existing Hardware 2 2 2
Existing Application 1 1 2
Minimize Number of Applications 1 1 1
Minimize Supporting Applications 0 1 1
Totals: 7 8 9
Grand Totals: 13 14 16
Provide Fault Isolation Capability
Minimize Cost (AD/FI)
Table 7 - Requirement/IF-Class Matrix 
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For the cost-related requirements, a physics model by itself cannot provide fault isolation.  As 
the LH2 system under study does not have an existing physics model, a supporting model must 
be generated to provide this capability.  Therefore, this class did not meet the ‘minimize 
supporting applications’ requirement.  The Fault Map Model class had a slight advantage over 
Expert Systems in that a commercial application is available (and tested in other NASA 
projects).  As Fault Map Models ranked slightly higher in both functional and cost requirements, 
this class will be pursued further.  It should be noted that there are still several unknowns 
associated with this class and additional analysis will be required. 
Model the System 
By selecting a model-based system engineering (MBSE) approach, the system will be modeled 
as part of the design process.  SysML uses diagrams to convey graphically the various 
subsystems to users.  The power of an MBSE approach is the underlying structure generated that 
links the various diagrams and model elements.  Since diagram development with element 
associations are part of the MBSE model construction, no additional effort is required to provide 
information related to AD/FI applications.  If augmenting an existing system that lacks the 
requisite documentation in a readily usable format, then at a minimum, the system structure 
should be modeled in SysML.  For this case study, BDDs and IBDs will be developed for the 
three major LH2 subsystems identified in the Scope Overview section to include: 
• Pressurization subsystem 
• Transfer subsystem 
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• Vent subsystem 
A BDD is used to describe physical characteristics of a system and uses a ‘block’ to represent 
those items.  The system itself is a block which can be decomposed to subsystems, components 
and parts as deemed necessary by the stakeholders.  The BDD shows the relationships in a 
hierarchal format.  Since the BDDs identify all the components used within a system, this 
information is used to define system scope.  While a BDD shows the composition of a block, an 
IBD differs in that it shows how the internal parts within a block are connected.  This includes 
the flow of matter, energy and data among these parts.  This information will assist with the 
generation of potential faults for the system. 
LH2 Pressurization Subsystem 
The LH2 pressurization system is used to pressurize the LH2 storage tank.  This pressure, 
combined with different sized valves or variable position valves, controls the flow rate to the 
vehicle for the various loading phases.  This system utilizes a main and auxiliary vaporizer (heat 
exchangers), a variable flow control valve (main) and control valves (main & auxiliary) to 
control the tank pressure.  A BDD titled ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ identifies the main components 
that comprise this subsystem (reference Figure 20 - BDD/LH2StorTankPressSys).  
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As stated earlier, the BDD gives a view of the structure comprised of blocks in a hierarchy 
format.  An IBD shows the internal connections of the block to include any media that is passed 
among those parts.  The ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ IBD shows how LH2 flows from the storage 
tank to the vaporizer, is converted to gaseous hydrogen (GH2) and returned to the tank (reference 
Figure 21 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys).  As LH2 has an expansion ratio of approximately 
833:1, a much larger volume is returned to the tank which drives the pressure upwards. 
Figure 20 - BDD/LH2StorTankPressSys 
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The ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ is a higher level view of this subsystem.  During the modeling 
process, these higher-level diagrams will be further refined until adequate detail is represented 
that meets the design, user, and stakeholder groups.  As an example, in the 
‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ BDD, there is a block titled ‘LH2VapCntrlVlvSys’ which is 
decomposed further in a BDD of the same name (reference Figure 22 - 
BDD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys). 
Figure 21 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys 
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The corresponding IBD shows the interaction among these components.  Note that parts that are 
not part of the corresponding BDD can still be included within the IBD when necessary to 
enhance the diagram’s view (annotated “from IBD”).  In addition, when the flow inputs and 
outputs (matter, energy and data) do not originate or terminate within the diagram, these are 
shown as ‘ported’ to the diagram’s frame (reference Figure 23 - IBD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys). 
Figure 22 - BDD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys 
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LH2 Transfer Subsystem 
There are two valve control assemblies (ground systems) that control the LH2 flow to the launch 
vehicle.  One of these valve skids is located at the Pad in the vicinity of the storage tank, while 
the other is on the mobile launcher platform just upstream of the Shuttle vehicle.  A BDD 
showing both valve complexes was developed.  Note that all the valves on these skids are 
included, though not all support LH2 transfer operations.  
Figure 23 - IBD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys 
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The focus of this IBD is to depict the transfer of LH2 from the storage tank to the launch vehicle.  
Therefore, some of the components listed in the BDD that do not directly support LH2 flow are 
not included in this IBD. 
LH2 Vent Subsystem 
As LH2 is a cryogenic liquid that is constantly boiling, anywhere you have the potential to trap 
liquid (i.e. storage/flight tanks, transfer line piping) must also have the ability to vent that part of 
the system to prevent over-pressurization.  For the system under study, there are four primary 
generators of GH2 that require active control during loading operations to include: 
1. The GH2 generated from the external tank while being filled. 
2. A liquid bleed flow used to thermally condition the Shuttles’ engines. 
3. The LH2 storage tank (following pressurization). 
4. The cross-country transfer lines that can be independently isolated. 
The Pad LH2 valve skid has the ability to vent the storage tank as well as the transfer line piping 
between the Pad and MLP valve skids.  The MLP LH2 valve skid controls venting of the transfer 
line between this valve skid and the vehicle.  It also controls the bleed flow from the vehicle.   
Model the AD/FI Applications 
When the down-selection was made to determine which AD and FI classes would be pursued, it 
was noted that enough information was not available to determine if these classes could fully 
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meet the requirements.  This section will model the selected AD and FI classes so this 
determination can be made. 
Anomaly Detection Model 
The AD class chosen was the Nearest Neighbor/Clustering method.  This is a data driven 
application.  Data is ingested into the model (referred to as training data) which provides a 
reference when later compared to test data.  Data sources can be classified as supervised, semi-
supervised or unsupervised.  Supervised data means that the data set includes both normal and 
anomalous data that is ‘labelled.’  Labelled data is known to be normal or otherwise.  Semi-
supervised data can include both normal and anomalous, but only the normal data is labelled.  
Unsupervised data is not labelled (Goldstein & Uchida, 2016).  For large datasets, it is typically 
impractical to label the data.  As this is the case for the LH2 system, only unsupervised data will 
be utilized.  This data comes from previous LH2 loadings that were deemed nominal following a 
post-test review.  This is not sufficient to label the data, but it does increase the level of 
confidence that the data represents only nominal operations.  When using unsupervised data, it is 
assumed to be normal and all exceptions anomalous.  However, it needs to be noted that such 
datasets may include (undetected) abnormal data.  In addition, divergence from nominal does not 
always reflect an anomalous condition.  It could mean the training data does not include all 
variations that represent nominal operations. 
 
The Nearest Neighbor and Clustering methods are two different techniques.  These were 
combined into a single class as the most common approach to implementing both involves 
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determining the Euclidian distance of a test point to either its nearest neighbor(s), or to a central 
point within a cluster.  This class ended up ranked the highest because there is an existing 
application that was originally developed by NASA and tested in various applications.  This 
application utilizes the Clustering model.  The main advantage to this is that the center of the 
clusters is calculated during the training phase, and that value is provided as a constant during 
testing.  The Nearest-Neighbor needs to know the test point so it can seek out the neighbors.  By 
shifting as much of the calculation process to the training-side of the model as possible, the 
computational complexity during testing is reduced enabling the application to run real-time. 
 
During the down-select process, there were four requirements that were flagged ‘unknown’ 
requiring further analysis.  The Clustering AD process will be modeled to determine if these 
requirements can be met.  These requirements include: 
• Have a high level of detection accuracy 
• Minimizes false alarms 
• Functions in multi-phasing and transient ops 
• Adds value above existing AD capabilities 
   
The K-Means model follows the methodology as described by the IMS developers (D. L. Iverson 
& Field, n.d.).  The initial testing will focus on a single cluster as the objective at this point is to 
test the sensitivity of changes in test data.  The training data is synthetic, but based on actual 
parameters used within the LH2 system.  The data types are also varied as this would be common 
when developing the desired vectors for system monitoring.  A vector would be composed of 
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measurements that are in some way related to one another (user defined).  This is intended to 
capture system performance by monitoring sensor groups that are influenced by associated 
operations. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The K-means algorithm makes the nominal/off-nominal determination of a data point based on 
its distance from the cluster’s center.  This application defines that center as the average between 
the high and low values for each vector element.  Subsequently, the only information needed to 
support testing is the high and low values for each range within the vector.  The training data 
(single cluster) uses only ten inputs.  This data is centered on the nominal value it represents, 
though it was varied by +/- 1% via a random number function.  So the total range of the data 
within this cluster does not exceed 2% (reference Table 8 - Training Data).  
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The measurements chosen have quite a bit of disparity in the numerical values.  To determine the 
distance a test point falls away from the cluster’s center, a Euclidian metric is used.  As this 
method determines a vector length, larger values will have a disproportional impact on this 
distance.  Therefore, the data should be normalized before entered into the vector.  There may be 
cases when it is desirable for the model to be more sensitive to critical indicators.  These 
parameters should still be normalized, but can then be weighted to obtain an elevated (or muted) 
response.  All data will be normalized to a 0-1 scale per equation 1.         
 
𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 −  𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 (1) 
 
The model works by finding the distance between two points: the cluster center and individual 
test data.  If a = (a1, a2,…,an) and b = (b1, b2,…,bn), the Euclidian distance (d) between points a 
and b is shown below (equation 2). 
Press1 Press2 Press3 Temp1 Temp2 VlvPos(%)
Nom 100 750 3000 -423 85 100
99.04 744.03 3004.98 -420.06 85.78 99.55
100.48 756.60 2980.02 -425.34 84.23 100.70
100.43 754.45 2985.01 -421.87 85.16 100.60
100.06 755.54 2991.16 -421.39 85.75 100.46
99.97 743.15 3013.36 -424.95 85.33 100.66
100.41 755.18 3003.67 -422.32 85.33 99.45
100.70 746.93 2971.44 -418.85 84.68 99.30
99.21 743.52 3008.02 -425.55 85.82 99.81
Min 99.0 743.1 2971.4 -425.5 84.2 99.3
Max 100.7 756.6 3013.4 -418.9 85.8 100.7
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 D
at
a
Table 8 - Training Data 
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𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) =  �(𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑏𝑏1)2 + (𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑏𝑏2)2 +⋯+  (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛)2 
 
(2) 
 
The training data tracks the high and low values for the entire range of each parameter for a 
given cluster.  As it uses the average of these two values, the normalized value for each element 
results in ‘0.5’.  Equation 2 can be summarized as follows: 
 
 𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) =  ��(0.5− 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
(3) 
 
With the training data established for a single cluster, the test data can be formulated.  This data 
will start nominally, and then be manipulated to simulate various anomalies.  This initial testing 
will assist in determining the sensitivity of the model to detect deviations from normal.  For 
demonstration purposes, the test data will be limited to a count of fifty.  Each vector length is 
calculated and then plotted.  When data is nominal, a baseline is formed.  An upward deflection 
from this baseline is an indication that one or more of the monitored sensors is deviating from 
nominal.  It is this visual cue that alerts the operator that the system has changed.  An alarm can 
be established by setting a threshold above the baseline. 
 
The initial data selected does not represent a related subsystem.  This data was chosen to model 
the responsiveness of a sensor grouping that includes both extremes (nominal pressures from 100 
to 3000 PSIG; temperatures from 85 to -423oF) and common values (pressure and valve position 
with a nominal value of 100).  Initial values are from actual data and all fall within the training 
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data’s min/max values, or are very close.  This ensures the initial vector generated would be 
assigned to this cluster.     
 
The first test will increment a single parameter (100 PSIG) in the test data.  Typically, a 100 
PSIG system would have an operating range of +/- 10% (90 – 110 PSIG).  The low and high 
alarm limits would be set to those operational limits.  A plot of this test is presented below 
(reference Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test).  The first 10 samples represent a nominal baseline.  
This measurement is incremented by 1 PSIG at every 10th sample (to 5%).  The min/max values 
for this indicator are 99.04 and 100.70 respectively (reference Figure 24 - Single Indicator Test).  
The first increment to 101 PSIG moved the parameter just outside its max-value, and the plot 
registered a slight increase from baseline.  As data toggles around a value, the baseline will 
oscillate to reflect these slight variations.  With each subsequent increment, the test data moved 
further from the cluster as exhibited with the upward trend from baseline.  A 5% increase on a 
single variable resulted in a distance value that is more than triple the baseline.      
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The next test involves incrementing multiple variables within the vector.  These values were 
adjusted both upward and downward.  The first 20 data points remain the same as in the previous 
test (baseline and 1% increase on 1 indicator).  The subsequent samples represent a 1% increase 
on a different measurement every 10th sample (reference Figure 25 - Multiple Indicator Test).  
Similar to the previous test, a 1% increment has a slight impact to the baseline.  In addition, the 
last variable incremented brings the baseline back down (Temp-2).  This measurement’s initial 
value is set just under the min-value for this parameter.  So a 1% increase brings the distance 
closer to the cluster as depicted by the plot.  An upward trend can be noted, but not necessarily 
significant enough to warrant additional evaluation.               
Figure 24 - Single Indicator Test 
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The next plot is the same five indicator test, but with 2% increments (reference Figure 26 - 
Multiple Indicator test (2%)).  The upward trend is now more noteworthy.  Had this been an 
interrelated grouping of measurements, this would have flagged the operator that the system was 
changing in a way not captured by the training data.  It should also be noted that the ten-sample 
increments are intended to test sensitivity.  If the change in the system did influence five of the 
six vector elements, the plot would have captured this over the transient range.  For short 
duration transients, this could make the plotted shift more apparent.  A longer duration trend may 
not be as obvious.  This is rationale for including a threshold limit as subtle trend changes may 
not be easy to observe, but a declining gap between trend and threshold should be noticed. 
 
Figure 25 - Multiple Indicator Test (1%) 
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The previous tests held the test data fixed so that the actual impact from a change in state was 
easily observed.  However, data from dynamic systems often have noise associated with the 
measurement (frequent oscillations above/below a value).  The previous tests will be repeated, 
but this time with noise being introduced into all the test variables.  This is accomplished by 
generating a random number that is +/- 1% of the nominal value, much like what was done with 
the training data.  The noise will be maintained while the data is being manipulated to simulate a 
change in the system.  This 2% total range is aggressive for simulating noise as it is not often 
observed to this extent.  It will also be applied to all the test variables, though many 
measurements are often stable indications.  Consequently, this test case should represent a 
worse-case scenario.  As the baseline is not so easily distinguished with noisy data, a full-run 
plot is displayed showing only the baseline from which subsequent test plots build upon 
(reference Figure 27 – Baseline Data (Noisy)). 
 
Figure 26 - Multiple Indicator test (2%) 
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The first 20 samples now represent a nominal baseline and the measurement is incremented by 1 
PSIG at every 20th sample to 5% (reference Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test (noisy)).  There is 
no longer a discernable ‘step’ formation with the plot.  However, there is an obvious upward 
trend that is approximately three times that of the baseline.  This is consistent with what was 
observed with the non-noisy test. 
 
Figure 27 – Baseline Data (Noisy) 
129 
 
 
 
The next two tests involve incrementing multiple variables within the vector.  A new indicator 
was added to the plot every 20th sample.  Each new value was increased by either 1% (reference 
Figure 29 - Multiple Indicator Test (1% - Noisy)), or 2% (reference Figure 30 - Multiple 
Indicator Test (2% - Noisy)) based on the nominal target, which is then modified to continue 
mimicking noise.  An upward trend can be noted in both plots, though it is much more 
predominant with 2% adjustments. 
 
Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test (noisy) 
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Figure 29 - Multiple Indicator Test (1% - Noisy) 
Figure 30 - Multiple Indicator Test (2% - Noisy) 
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Transition Analysis 
One of the requirements levied is that the AD application function during the different 
operational phases and be able to capture transient conditions.  As the limit settings for the 
indicators monitoring these transitions are inhibited between phases, much of the alarms are not 
available for these short durations.  Hence, an AD application that can determine if the transition 
was nominal or not was deemed desirable.   
 
For this testing, data was used from both STS-134 and STS-135 Shuttle missions (reference 
Figure 31 - STS-134 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) and Figure 32 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to 
FF)).  This data includes several pressure sensors and one temperature measurement.  These 
indicators are related in that changes in the flow of LH2 will influence all four indicators.  The 
data from the STS-134 mission will be used as the training data for the model.  Both missions 
took place on Pad A.  STS-134 used MLP-2 while STS-135 took place on MLP-3.  The 
timeframe within the loading operations targets the transition from Slow Fill (approximately 900 
GPM) to Fast Fill (approximately 8000 GPM).    
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Figure 32 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) 
Figure 31 - STS-134 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) 
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LH2 Slow Fill involves a low flow rate, and all three pressures can be seen to be near-equal.  As 
the LH2 external tank (ET) is loaded under pressure, the line pressures are gradually increasing.  
For STS-135, an ET vent cycle is observed just before transition as noted by the transfer line 
pressure drop that precedes an increase.  Fast Fill is initiated by opening a larger fill valve 
increasing the flow rate from approximately 900 GPM to 8,000 GPM.  The transfer line 
pressures all increase, but the impact of the various flow restrictions becomes obvious at the 
higher flow rate based on the disparity among the pressure measurements.  The ET vent valve 
cycling becomes more frequent as depicted by the oscillations seen in the pressures. 
 
The temperature is slowly decreasing towards that of LH2, and is within 2oF at the latter part of 
Slow Fill.  When Fast Fill is initiated, the temperature starts to decline quicker as the transfer line 
pressure is elevated (flow rate increased).  During this transition, it is typical to see a slight 
upward spike in temperature caused by liquid hitting the un-wetted surfaces which generates 
additional boil off of liquid.  As the line completely fills with liquid, a rapid chill down to LH2 
temperatures occurs. 
 
Although the temperature decline profiles shown in figures 35 and 36 are similar, there is a shift 
between the two.  These values are scaled the same, and the value ranges shown in the plots 
equate to approximately 1.5oF for each indicator.  Therefore, this is high-granularity data 
(instrument range is -409oF to 427oF).  Assuming the temperature of LH2 remains constant (at 
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pressures shown), a bias can be determined when the temperatures bottom-out.  In this case, it is 
approximately 0.8oF.  Although this is a low value, and an acceptable bias, it is significant when 
compared to the 1.5oF.  The following plot includes the K-Distance with the STS-135 data 
(Figure 33 - STS-135 Flow and K-Distance). 
 
 
Figure 33 - STS-135 Flow and K-Distance 
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The K-Distance value shows the system is off-nominal (compared to the STS-134 data) during 
Slow Fill.  One of the advantages of a K-Means methodology is it is easy to determine which 
variable(s) are responsible for the deviation.  In the following table (reference Table 9 - Elements 
used for K-Distance), K-Distance is the variable plotted (against GMT).  Also shown are the 
normalized values of the four variables that make up this distance calculation.  Only the Orbiter 
Inlet temperature is (significantly) over one making this temperature the only outlier. 
 
The next test pulls the temperature out of the plot to see how K-Distance works with the three 
pressure values during transition (reference Figure 34 - Pressure and K-Distance).  An increasing 
trend during Slow Fill shows some disparity compared to the training data, but at just over a 
value of 1.0, this is not considered problematic.  A spike to just over 3.0 during transition is 
noted.  K-Distance then returns to nominal, though it does track with the ET vent valve cycles. 
GMT K-Dist P-SkidIn P-SkidOut P-OrbIn T-OrbIn
6:46:39 5.504 0.60 0.67 0.40 6.00
6:46:39 5.502 0.60 0.50 0.40 6.00
6:46:40 5.509 0.20 0.50 0.40 6.00
6:46:40 6.008 0.20 0.50 0.40 6.50
Table 9 - Elements used for K-Distance 
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Finally, the same data is used but with a failure inserted.  The Skid Inlet pressure was held at a 
fixed value during the ramp up to Fast Fill pressure (reference Figure 35 - Pressure and K-
Distance with Failure).  This failure mimics a loss of communication to the sensor, and 
subsequently, the value in the buffer does not change.  When this type of failure occurs within 
the measurement’s limit settings, an alarm is not produced.  If it is close to nominal system 
values, it is not easily recognized on a system display view.  This failure type can be 
distinguished on a plot, with dynamic data, as it is characterized by a ‘flat line.’  The K-Distance 
plots the same during Slow Fill and transition, but once the failure is inserted, it climbs to 
Figure 34 - Pressure and K-Distance 
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approximately 4.0.  In this case, the K-Means AD method did well to identify a failure occurring 
during transition.       
   
Fault Isolation Model 
All three of the original FI classes require extensive support to implement this capability into a 
large system.  A single-fault method would look at all components and the various failure modes 
that they can experience.  If there is a need to consider multiple faults, then this effort can grow 
quite quickly.  To start this mapping exercise, the focus will be on individual components.  In 
addition, if a components’ failure mode cannot be traced to a detecting indicator, then it is not 
Figure 35 - Pressure and K-Distance with Failure 
138 
 
included.  For example, filters have a failure mode in which the filter media fails allowing 
possible contaminants to pass.  Such a failure would likely be undetectable by monitoring system 
pressure.  However, debris may now pass the element and block flow thru a downstream orifice.  
A plugged orifice can be detected by a drop in downstream pressure.  Subsequently, the model 
will (possibly) fault the orifice, which is behaving anomalously, though the root cause of the 
problem is the failed filter element.   
 
Failure modes for components that cannot occur do to configuration are also omitted.  This drops 
modes such as ‘internal leakage’ or ‘failure to close’ for valves that remain open during the 
entire operation.  The initial pass at mapping the system will concentrate on single fault 
scenarios.  It is projected that the model will be expanded to include multiple faults and all 
modes identified on the system fault tree.  With this initial pass, modes such as ‘relief valve fails 
to open’ are excluded as it first requires a failure to over-pressurize the system. 
 
As a fault map model was the selected class, the focus will now be on developing one that 
encompasses the LH2 system.  The literature review was unable to uncover detail methods 
utilized by the (very few) vendors.  So Excel will be employed to capture and organize the data 
needed to generate the mapping.  It is anticipated that any application selected to implement this 
technology will have the capability to either work with Excel data (either by linking to the file or 
importing the desired data).  The following outlines the fields to be populated: 
• Component - As labeled by its unique identifier 
• Description – Components nomenclature 
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• Failure Mode - As identified by the SysML model, and as required based on component 
configuration 
• Sensor – The primary indicator used to detect the failure identified. 
• State – The indicators’ state that flagged the issue (high, low, erratic, nominal) 
• Additional Sensor and corresponding State fields as required to characterize multiple 
sensors used in detection 
 
With a fault map knowledgebase being created within Excel (using the fields defined above), the 
FI inputs can be tested while the knowledgebase is being produced.  Simply adding a filter to 
each of the fields enables the operator to select an offending measurement to get a list of 
potential component faults.  If there are multiple sensors available with applicable states, these 
too can be selected to refine the list, thus allowing the SME to test inputs in parallel with 
development. To model this effort, a knowledgebase for a purge panel feeding the LH2 transfer 
lines was generated.  A high limit setting is exceeded for one of the indicators (PT057), which is 
then selected (reference Table 10 - Fault Map (PT057-High)). 
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Table 10 - Fault Map (PT057-High) 
 
This results in a list of 26 component/failure combinations.  Since a high limit was exceeded, the 
state of the corresponding sensor is then filtered on ‘high,’ reducing the potential failures to 
seven.  A secondary indication (PT076) is also available for the remaining faults (this could be 
multiple indicators).  The field filtering can continue, but with only 7 items listed, the logic can 
be carried out by observation (reference Table 11 - Fault Map (PT076 Check)).  If a review of 
PT076 in the timeframe that the alarm was received showed no change in status, then a failure of 
PT076 is suspected, which can be further confirmed by looking to see if PT5977 remained 
nominal.  For this example, we will assume PT076 also diverged high (it does not have to set off 
an alarm), leaving one additional indicator (PT047) that could have been influenced by the 
Comp Description Failure Mode Sensor-1 State-1 Sensor-2 State-2 Sensor-3 State-3
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegCreepsHigh PT057 High PT076 High
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegCreepsLow PT057 Low PT076 Low
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegFailsClosed PT057 Low PT076 Low
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegFailsOpen PT057 High PT076 High PT047 Low
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegLeaksExt PT057 Low PT076 Low
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegLeaksInt PT057 High PT076 High
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegPressUnstable PT057 Erratic PT076 Erratic
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegCreepsHigh PT057 High PT076 High
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegCreepsLow PT057 Low PT076 Low
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegFailsClosed PT057 Low PT076 Low
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegFailsOpen PT057 High PT076 High PT047 Low
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegLeaksExt PT057 Low PT076 Low
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegLeaksInt PT057 High PT076 High
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegPressUnstable PT057 Erratic PT076 Erratic
RV059 750 Relief Valve VlvFailsOpen PT057 Low PT076 Low
RV059 750 Relief Valve VlvLeaksExt PT057 Low PT076 Low
RV059 750 Relief Valve VlvLeaksInt PT057 Low PT076 Low
FL063 750 Filter FilterPlugged PT057 Low PT076 Low
FL063 750 Filter FllterLeaksExt PT057 Low PT076 Low
MV105 750 Purge-Leg Iso Valve VlvLeaksExt PT057 Low
SV060 Vent Line Purge Sol Valve VlvLeaksExt PT057 Low
SV065 Fill Line Purge S/O Sol Valve VlvLeaksExt PT057 Low
SV038 Fill Line Purge Sol Valve VlvLeaksExt PT057 Low
PT057 750 GHe Press IndHigh PT057 High PT076 Nominal PT5977 Nominal
PT057 750 GHe Press IndLow PT057 Low PT076 Nominal PT5977 Nominal
PT057 750 GHe Press IndErratic PT057 Erratic PT076 Nominal PT5977 Nominal
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change in system status.  If this trended downwards, then the FI leads to two possible faults (vs. 
six if it remained nominal).  These include the hand or dome regulators to have failed open.   
 
 
Assuming PT047 did drop, this implies either the hand or dome regulator failed open.  Hand and 
dome regulators work in parallel.  Hand regulators provide finite control in manually setting an 
operational pressure.  The trade-off is that this manual control capability results in a component 
used in low flow applications.  Dome regulators have the capacity for high-flow, but cannot be 
manually adjusted.  Pressure is set by applying the desired pressure into the top (dome) of the 
regulator using a hand regulator.   
 
The failure logic for this scenario is described as follows.  When a regulator fails open, it is no 
longer able to control pressure, and the downstream side of the regulator is exposed to the 
upstream pressures (3,000 vs. 750 PSIG).  If the hand regulator fails, it applies 3,000 PSIG to the 
dome regulator which then opens fully.  This is the same outcome if the dome regulator fails 
open.  In both cases, the 750 PSIG system is now exposed to 3,000 PSIG, though this leg 
includes a relief valve to protect against over-pressurization.  There is another pressure reduction 
in this leg (750 to 80 PSIG) via a hand regulator only.  If the upstream pressure to this regulator 
Comp Description Failure Mode Sensor-1 State-1 Sensor-2 State-2 Sensor-3 State-3
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegCreepsHigh PT057 High PT076 High
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegFailsOpen PT057 High PT076 High PT047 Low
HR051 3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome) RegLeaksInt PT057 High PT076 High
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegCreepsHigh PT057 High PT076 High
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegFailsOpen PT057 High PT076 High PT047 Low
DR054 3000/750 Dome Reg RegLeaksInt PT057 High PT076 High
PT057 750 GHe Press IndHigh PT057 High PT076 Nominal PT5977 Nominal
Table 11 - Fault Map (PT076 Check) 
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spikes to relief pressure (880 PSIG), then an upward deflection would be expected on the 80 
PSIG leg, monitored by PT076.  Since the dome regulator is capable of high flow, combined 
with the high upstream pressure, it is likely flowing through the relief valve (which is sized to 
handle the maximum flow).  Therefore, a drop in upstream pressure is expected (PT047) as the 
system struggles to maintain 3,000 PSIG with off-nominally high flow.  
Perform Trade Studies 
When the preliminary framework was developed, it was envisioned that after down-selecting to 
classes that best met requirements, there would be many options to choose from.  This did not 
turn out to be the case.  The existing limit-setting, plot capabilities and software controls 
employed in industry (and current KSC launch systems) are sufficient for most applications.  In 
addition, the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s) that have become common in remote-
operated control systems are embedded with health and status capabilities specific to C&C 
functions.  Subsequently, proficient AD/FI expertise supporting control systems is included with 
the purchase of this hardware.  There is an abundance of techniques found within the literature, 
but most have not advance beyond the conceptual phase.  This does not diminish the need for 
this technology, but it does limit the commercial options.  This trade study will assess using an 
available application or developing one internally.  Both are viable options.  
Anomaly Detection Application 
A commercial application (IMS) exists that implements a K-Means method of AD.  This 
application can run both real-time and playback historical data.  It allows the user to select the 
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vector elements (variables) for inclusion and cluster size when inputting the training data.  When 
running, the user can assign a threshold over the k-distance to be used as an alarm.  It also has 
the ability to show how much each measurement contributes to the k-distance to readily 
determine which indicators are off-nominal. 
 
The k-means methodology was modeled using Excel.  However, this application cannot provide 
real-time system monitoring.  It can provide playback of test data, but dataset size may overcome 
Excel’s limitations requiring both training and test data be segmented.  The clusters for the 
model were developed manually, but this could be automated using an Excel macro.  The other 
functions provided by IMS (element selection, cluster radius, thresholds, variable contribution) 
can all be mirrored in Excel.  
 
The AD model testing also resolved the ‘unknown’ requirements as follows: 
• Have a high level of detection accuracy 
o The model illustrated a sensitivity to change for both static and dynamic data 
when compared to nominal training data.  The training data is unsupervised, so 
there could be anomalous information contained within.  A diverging k-distance     
shows a deviation from the training data which does not always reflect an off-
nominal condition. 
• Minimizes false alarms 
o When ‘zoomed in’ on a high-resolution temperature indicator, testing did show a 
significant deviation in k-distance.  After a reviewing the plot, it was determined 
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that an acceptable bias existed between the instruments on from two different 
MLPs.   
o These types of issues can be uncovered when testing historical data, and there 
are several actions that can be taken to mitigate the issue as follows: 
 Training data can be matched to the launch elements used (i.e. use Pad A 
and MLP-2 training data for launches using this combination).  This 
ensures the same sensors are being compared. 
 Add multiple launches to the training dataset.  This will further minimize 
the false alarms by capturing system variations within the training 
dataset. 
 Each element within the vector can be weighted to amplify or mute the 
impact on k-distance.  The measurement tested is critical, so it would 
likely not be muted.  However, this is an option for other non-critical 
sensors. 
• Functions in a multi-phasing/transient ops 
o Testing (Slow Fill to Fast Fill) demonstrated that transient operations can be 
captured. 
• Adds value above existing AD capabilities 
o The sensitivity analysis showed that both single and multiple indicator 
divergences can be detected well before a limit exceedance is triggered.  This is 
a very strong capability. 
• Minimizes number of applications and/or supporting applications 
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o This adds only one new application and requires no supporting applications.        
Fault Isolation Application 
It should be noted the LH2 system has local gages for viewing the system status which are 
located throughout the system.  The fault mapping concentrates on a system configuration that 
supports launch vehicle loadings as these are the time-critical and hazardous operations that take 
place in a control room.  The remote sensors available are a smaller subset of what can be 
accessed locally.  In one case, a storage area panel that provides pneumatic pressure to all the 
remote operated valves is set up manually to support these operations.  There are local gages 
used to reflect the supply pressure and for setting up two pressure reductions, including primary 
and secondary legs for the actuation pressure.  However, the only remote sensor on this panel is a 
pressure switch that is sensing only the actuation pressure leg.  In this case, all the components 
that can impact this pressure, and have a failure mode that results in a loss of pressure, will be 
linked to the switch.  Failures that increase pressure above nominal will go undetected.  
Consequently, should this switch unexpectedly drop out, a large list of potential faults will be 
generated.  With only a discrete measurement providing notification, the information needed to 
refine this list is just not available.  Should the pressure dropout be real (and not a switch failure), 
and pressure continues to drop, any actuated valves will soon change state confirming the loss of 
pneumatic control. 
 
This example is being presented to highlight that an FI application will be limited to what data is 
provided by the sensor array (applicable for the physics, expert systems and fault map FI 
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classes).  Often, the fault cannot be isolated until the local hardware can be accessed to view the 
local instruments and/or take additional troubleshooting steps.  Therefore, expectations need to 
be tempered for FI performance.  During the analysis and development of an FI application, 
system design shortcomings may be uncovered.  These can be addressed to determine if a system 
modification is warranted.  Therefore, developing an FI knowledgebase also provides an indirect 
system review which is also beneficial. 
 
A commercial application known as TEAMS (described in literature review) is available for fault 
mapping, and has been previously tested on a cryogenic test-bed at KSC.  This application can 
support real-time monitoring and includes a means to encompass system configuration (via 
switches).  There was only over-view information discovered as to how this application works, 
so it was not modeled.   
 
A component-sensor-fault related knowledgebase was developed using Excel.  The fields 
selected were those that are projected to be included should TEAMS (or another fault map 
application) be selected.  The reason for developing an internal knowledgebase is this need 
amounts to an organization of data issue, and a means to present data in a timely manner with 
minimal input.  It was presumed that Excel could accomplish this task, so a model was 
developed to test this functionality.  Should an existing application be chosen, the effort to create 
the knowledgebase within Excel will likely not be unproductive as it is anticipated this data can 
be ported to other applications.    
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The FI model testing also resolved the ‘unknown’ requirements as follows: 
• Lists all potential faulty components 
o This requirement is partially met (by design).  Per the filter/orifice example 
described previously, FI will list all components it can link to the indicator(s) in 
question.  This may not include the root component responsible for the failure as 
that failure mode may not be detectable with the current sensor array 
• Minimal development 
o This requirement is partially met.  There is minimal development related to 
getting an application active.  However, populating the application with all the 
possible component/failure-modes will be an extensive and challenging exercise. 
• Minimizes number of applications and/or supporting applications 
o This adds only one new application and requires no supporting applications. 
Make Recommendations 
For AD, the K-Means method was shown to be sensitive to changes when compared to previous 
operations that were deemed nominal.  The model testing resolved the unknown requirements, 
and this application has the flexibility to be ‘dialed-in’ to meet various system peculiarities.  
However, it needs to be reiterated that the training data is unsupervised, so it is possible that 
abnormal data may be embedded within this dataset.  The recommendation is to use the IMS 
application.  It was developed by NASA and they retained a licensing exemption that allows its 
use for NASA programs. 
 
148 
 
When the Shuttle program gained real-time plotting capability, this provided the ability to 
monitor the system over time.  As there is very limited monitor space, only one plot could be 
viewed at a time.  For implementation, it is envisioned that K-Means vectors would be built that 
are common to a saved plot of related data.  A display would be set up that showed multiple k-
distance graphs.  Should one of these start to diverge high, the corresponding plot would be 
brought up so the operator can see the plotted data of the indicators of concern.  This 
methodology provides a ‘health’ indicator allowing the operator to indirectly monitor multiple 
plots on a single display.  In addition, a threshold value can be set that will alarm should a k-
distance value exceed it (whether it is visible or not). 
 
During the FI modeling, a knowledgebase was developed using Excel.  The intent was to see if 
the desired information could be presented with minimal user input.  As the model for this 
functionality turned out to be relatively easy, creating a comprehensive knowledgebase with 
Excel is the recommendation going forward.  If it later turns out that this is not sufficient, then a 
fault-map application could be considered at that time.  Both methods are level in their ability to 
meet requirements, though minimal development could only be partially met.  As this is an 
extensive effort, Excel has an advantage in that it requires only SME support where those 
inputting the model require both SME and FI application know-how. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS/EVALUATION 
A preliminary framework was proposed in Chapter 4 that provided a methodological approach to 
selecting anomaly detection (AD) and fault isolation (FI) technologies that can be adapted to 
complex systems.  A case study was presented in Chapter 5 that followed this process to 
augment the liquid hydrogen (LH2) system at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch pads.  
This system supported loading the external tanks (ET) to support Space Shuttle launches, and 
will be used again for NASA’s next-generation Space Launch System (SLS) rockets.  As LH2 is 
the fuel for the Shuttle main engines, it is very flammable.  LH2 is also a cryogenic fluid (-423 
oF).  This involves insulation challenges as the liquid is constantly boiling.  To minimize losses, 
the ET is not loaded until very late in the launch countdown (within ten hours of planned 
launch).  Loading the Shuttle is performed from a control room located several miles from the 
launch pads.  Therefore, these remote, time-critical and hazardous operations make the LH2 
system a good candidate to supplement with AD/FI capabilities.  This chapter will analyze the 
case study and its implementation of the framework process, and then finalize the proposed 
framework.  This framework will then be validated by applying the process to the liquid oxygen 
(LOX) system at KSC that is also used to load the ET. 
Framework Analysis 
The framework process follows the chart shown previously (reference Figure 8 - Preliminary 
Framework Process Flow).  This analysis will step through each process block and review the 
details necessary to accomplish these steps.  It will also note any changes that will be reflected in 
the final version. 
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Scope the System 
Establishing the system scope not only identified the system boundaries under study, it also 
identified exiting AD/FI capabilities.  The LH2 system was broken to three major subsystems 
(Pressurization, transfer and vent).  The existing AD capabilities were described (no existing FI 
functionality) so that new applications with common functionality are ground-ruled out. 
 
This task did highlight a couple of items worth noting as this impacted the scope of this case 
study.  First, the command and control (C&C) system at KSC went through an upgrade utilizing 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs).  As this new C&C architecture has significant health and 
status capability embedded within, further AD/FI augmentation was considered unneeded.  
Second, as hydrogen is very flammable, and potentially explosive, the ability to monitor for 
leaks and/or fires is considered crucial.  This is already accomplished via a ‘HazGas’ subsystem 
that has installed leak and fire detectors throughout the LH2 system. 
Identify and Categorize Sensor Data 
Identifying all the sensors supporting both AD and FI applications is a way to ensure inclusion of 
all possible measurements.  Sensors are monitored for nominal operations with AD, and used to 
authenticate fault-modes with FI.  Most system designs include a parts list (as does the LH2 
system).  However, when using SysML to model the system, it becomes intuitive to organize the 
component blocks in ‘packages’ that reflect the component type for later retrievals.  This was 
helpful for itemizing the types of indicators.  When these instruments are later depicted in IBDs 
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(as instances of ‘part properties’), they are readily found within those diagrams, and IBDs also 
reflect how they are used. 
Identify and Categorize Fault Modes 
For this case study, knowing the fault modes was not required to apply the selected AD utility.  
AD focused on the ability to detect instruments deviating from the norm, and therefore, it did not 
consider the faults that drove the disparity.  The FI application requires that all faults be 
identified, and those that can be detected by the system instrument array be catalogued within a 
knowledgebase.  As stated previously, this can be a comprehensive task for a complex system. 
 
This framework development is guided by system engineering principles of which one best 
practice is to leverage off of existing artifacts.  If a SysML model is being developed, then the 
corresponding IBDs will depict which components are within the system, and how they are being 
used.  This information might make it practical to auto-generate a fault tree (FT) using the 
information generated by the system design.  The model was extended by adding generic failure 
modes (blocks) and allocating them to the components shown on the IBD (via a relationship 
matrix).  The matrix was exported to Excel, and a macro written to draw a basic fault tree as 
described in Chapter 5.  This task was successful in highlighting the potential of extending 
SysML so that existing design constructs can assist in generating other design products.  Fault 
trees are typically generated as a separate project to the design effort.  Safety engineering 
oversees the development, though it is supplemented by the SME’s who have the required 
technical expertise.  Having the ability to auto-generate an initial FT that is directly related to the 
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design documents is efficient in the use of engineering labor, less prone to mistakes and likely to 
identify deficiencies in the design product(s) earlier in their life-cycle.  This proof-of-concept 
exercise focused on FT’s, but it is foreseen that other design or operational products could 
benefit from SysML’s flexibility in working with its core data. 
Identify and Categorize AD/FI Applications 
This section of the test case started with the discussion on requirements.  One of the changes to 
the framework process chart is to pull the requirements development out into its own block 
following the system scope effort.  The functional requirements development does need to follow 
the system scope.  While defining system scope, having to apply AD/FI was ground-ruled out for 
C&C functions and Leak & Fire detection.  In addition, the existing AD/FI methods were 
appraised.  It is expected that the detection results will overlap, but the detection methods should 
not be common.  This type of information is helpful before functional requirements are 
produced.   
 
Requirement generation was planned to precede the AD/FI selection process, so the preliminary 
framework scheduled this activity accordingly.  However, since the sensor and fault (more so the 
faults) organization can be a comprehensive undertaking, the requirements should be defined 
prior to committing resources to this effort.  These actions are shown in parallel with the system 
categorization items, but the process flow will be changed to drive the requirements generation 
prior to additional work following system scope. 
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The requirements generated were categorized as functional (qualitative) and cost related.  They 
were purposely kept at a higher level for several reasons.  For the functional requirements, a 
concern exits that requirements that are too restrictive may exclude technologies that provide 
considerable benefit to the system.  Also, as this system is being augmented with additional 
AD/FI, the current operational needs are satisfied by the implementation of the original design 
requirements.  On the cost side, the requirements are written generically to keep potential project 
expenses minimized.  The case study had to decide between existing applications or internal 
development.  These options have different means of costing that impact different groups.          
 
Modeling the AD/FI technologies is time consuming, and therefore, modeling all the potential 
applications is not practical.  In addition, many methods found in the literature did not provide 
adequate details to build a test model.  To lessen the potential effort, both the AD and FI 
applications were divided into classes based on common underlying techniques used to realize 
their objective.  These classes were then ranked based on their ability to meet requirements.  This 
is an intermediate step intended to reduce the potential candidates to a class that is most likely to 
meet system needs.   
 
There is a cost requirement that gives priority to an existing application (or mature 
development).  This requirement is based on an assumption that it is cheaper to purchase a 
software license than it is to internally develop and sustain this functionality.  In addition, 
commercially available packages publish the capabilities of the product making it easier to 
determine which functional requirements they could satisfy.  Thus, the requirements derived for 
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this case study favor such applications (both directly and indirectly) as reflected in the down-
select decisions.  The ability of the chosen classes to meet the functionality requirements, related 
to performance, remained mostly ‘unknown.’  Resolving these unknowns is what drives model 
development and subsequent testing.           
Model the System  
This framework is designed to work with both new projects and legacy systems.  As the SysML 
language was selected for modeling the system, it is assumed any new design would also be 
implemented with this standard.  Therefore, a suite of SysML diagrams would be available (or 
quickly generated) to the applicable stakeholders.  This assumption is based on the remote 
likelihood of selecting multiple MBSE standards.  Should another language/method be selected, 
the case study still provides an outline of system engineering practices that apply, and may be 
implemented in a similar way with the tool(s) supporting those standards. 
 
This test case is enhancing a legacy system used for Shuttle (and planned to support future 
launch programs).  The ground systems were modified from the Apollo program in the late-
1970’s/early-1980’s predating any formal MBSE standards.  Subsequently, a mature design 
exists, though it epitomizes a document-centric methodology that was predominant at that time.  
For operational systems, the goal is not to model the entire system as this is not an efficient use 
of resources.  However, if the product life-cycle is to continue into the future, then incorporating 
SysML elements to support system design changes may be appropriate.  In this case, four of the 
nine available SysML diagrams supported this effort to include: 
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• Package Diagram 
o A Package Diagram is required to contain all other SysML diagrams generated, so 
it is required for any SysML model.  It is used simply to organize the model, and 
works very similar to folders used within Windows.  The package name is 
included in the frame-label of all other diagrams.  
• Block Definition Diagram (BDD) 
o BDD’s were developed to show the composition of the various subsystems 
(LH2StorTankPressSys) and also as a way to graphically display elements stored 
as blocks (components, failure modes).  This supported scoping the system. 
• Internal Block Diagram (IBD) 
o An IBD shows the internal workings of a single block to include the inner 
connections of the parts and flow between them.  The block ‘LH2StorTankPress’ 
was created and showed via additional blocks of all the components that 
comprised this subsystem.  An IBD was then created from the 
‘LH2StorTankPress’ block.  However, all the composite blocks included in the 
BDD are changed to a property of ‘parts.’  A block shows a given component 
used within the system, where as an IBD shows an instance of that part (block 
equates to a part number – of which there may be many used - where an IBD part 
refers to the unique identifier for that component).  IBD’s were used to support 
system scoping, FT development, failure-mode development and fault mapping.      
• Requirements Diagram 
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o SysML has a very strong capability to track requirements from initiation to 
closure.  Requirements diagrams were used to develop the AD/FI application 
requirements. 
Model the AD/FI Applications 
It could not be determined if both the AD and FI classes selected could fully meet the 
requirements.  This drove a need to model and test these methods to determine if they 
incorporating them within the LH2 system was feasible.   
Anomaly Detection Analysis 
The first tests performed a sensitivity analysis of the K-Means method of detection.  A single 
cluster was simulated, and training data was selected.  The initial variables represented: 
• Multiple data types (pressure, temperature, valve position)  
• Common value ranges (0-100%; 0-150 PSIG, 0-150 oF) 
• Dissimilar value ranges (0-150 and (-409)-(-423) oF; 0-150, 0-750 and 0-3000 PSIG) 
These variables replicate actual indicators within the LH2 system, and the initial training data 
values come from real data.  However, they are not related to one another.  They were selected as 
the initial testing is looking for responses from a diverse dataset.   
 
When a cluster is formed, only the high and low values from each element within the vector are 
needed to determine a k-distance.  The initial training data values were randomized to +/- 1%, 
and the resulting high/low values retained.  This simulates the influence of training data as each 
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variable will have differing impacts to that baseline as corresponding value trends away from 
nominal, and by raising the k-distance baseline above zero.   
 
With training data simulated, a single indicator was incremented by 1% up to 5%.  As the initial 
1% increment will keep it within or near the training data high/low values, only a slight shift is 
observed.  As the increments continue, the baseline shifts grow.  At 3%, the baseline has roughly 
doubled, and at 5%, more than tripled.  This test is repeated, but with five different indicators 
being incremented (both high and low) as this mimics the data being related to one another.  A 
1% increment keeps all the test values within or near the training data high/lows, and a slight 
increase is noted with four of the five increments.  The initial starting value on the last indicator 
was set outside the training data low value, so an upward increment brought it closer to its norm.  
Overall, a slight upward trend is noted.  Each is then increased by 2%, and the baseline nearly 
triples.   
 
Often, the data being tested is not as stable as shown previously.  The same series of tests were 
repeated, but this time with +/-1% of randomized noise simulated with the test data.  The results 
were similar, though the stable data plots stepped up while the noisy ones trended.  Selecting a 
threshold value is a subjective task and will likely be based on how the baseline plot is acting.  
As a general rule for this case study, a doubling of the baseline should flag the operator of a 
possible trend away from nominal.  A tripling should indicate divergence from nominal (as 
defined by the training data).  A 100 PSIG system would have limits set at +/- 10%.  Therefore, 
the K-Means method would have flagged the operator well before an alarm is issued. 
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The next test was specific to a requirement that was specifically developed to address an existing 
limitation.  During the requisite configuration changes for the various loading phases, the limit 
settings are inhibited at the end of one phase, and activated (possibly to new levels) at the start of 
the next phase.  This essentially turns off the alarms during these transitions.  To test the K-
Means ability to monitor these transient conditions, data from STS-134 (training) and STS-135 
(test) during an LH2 transition from Slow Fill to Fast Fill is used.  When presented during the 
case study, it was noted that there is an approximate 0.8 oF temperature bias between the two 
mobile launch platforms used for these launches (an acceptable tolerance).  This bias further 
impacted the k-distance value due to the narrow range of the indicator in this timeframe.  
However, as the bias exists during the entire plot, further examination is necessary. 
 
The STS-134 & 135 LH2 Slow Fill to Fast Fill transitions were previously plotted (reference 
figures 31 and 32).  Both the pressure and temperature profiles, and the pressure values were 
much alike.  Only the temperature stood out due to the noted bias.  The STS-135 transition plot 
was changed to include the STS134 temperature (reference Figure 36 - STS-135 LH2 Loading 
(SF to FF) with STS-134 Temp.  This plot starts out with a k-distance between 5-6 (very high) 
and remains above four throughout Slow Fill.  During this time, a new cluster is being defined 
with approximately a 2 PSIG increase on the three pressure indicators.  As the temperature is bit-
toggling between 2 or 3 values, and a bit equates to 0.072 oF, the difference of the high/low 
values for this cluster equate to a small number.  So normalizing a value with 0.8 bias results in a 
high k-distance value.  During transition, a couple of spikes are noted, but these were also 
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observed in the graph with only pressures plotted.  The spike is elevated some from the pressure-
only calculations, but a view of the vector element’s normalized values indicates all four 
measurements contributed roughly the same to this spike.   
 
Following the transition spikes, the k-distance drops to just over one.  As the bias is still present, 
this is unexpected.  At this point, the three transfer line pressures have diverged to their Fast Fill 
values, and a cyclic pattern can be observed as they track the ET vent valve cycling that 
maintains back pressure on the tank.  During this period, new clusters are being defined, but the 
temperature measurement is more active.  This larger gap (approximately 1.0 oF) between the 
temperature’s high and low element values lowers the normalized value, and subsequently, the k-
distance. 
 
The final observation is related to the latter part of Fast Fill.  Again, the temperature is bit-
toggling which drove the k-distance value significantly higher during Slow Fill.  For Fast Fill, k-
distance drops to approximately 0.5.  What is also observed is that the STS-135 temperature has 
dropped into a region where the STS-134 temperature had been active (training data), and the 
three pressures had already started their Fast Fill profile.  Therefore, the low k-distance value is 
correlating to the activities immediately following the start of Fast Fill for STS-134, and not the 
latter part of Fast Fill when it decreases to LH2 temperatures.   
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This test highlights that when working with dynamic data, there may be times this data better fits 
a cluster that does not reflect the same activity from which generated the test data.  An 
observation such as this is desired when doing post-test data reviews as the time is available to 
resolve the issue.  However, this was a non-issue that was initially depicted as off-nominal, and 
with the bias remaining constant, later displayed as nominal.  These are not the type of events 
wanted for supporting real-time operations as they can distract the operators from their primary 
goal of monitoring system operations.  
  
Figure 36 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) with STS-134 Temp 
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Fault Isolation Analysis 
The implementation selected involves generating a knowledgebase which is a straightforward 
task.  However, there is an open issue regarding inclusion of single vs. multiple fault modes as 
follows: 
• If the knowledgebase is to include multiple-fault failures: 
o Should it be limited to auxiliary and/or secondary subsystems that are activated 
due to a failure on the primary subsystem? 
o Should it include the possibility of dual failures within a related subsystem (i.e. 
a regulator fails open and the corresponding relief valve fails to open)? 
o Should it include components that may be impacted due to failure propagation 
thru the system (i.e. an over-pressurization due to relief valve failure)? 
As this task is comprehensive, the initial focus should be including all single-fault modes that 
can be detected by instrumentation.  It can also include auxiliary or secondary subsystems as 
these will be common to the primary side (and are often active and being monitored).  As the 
goal is to present likely candidates, including multiple failures will likely generate lengthy lists 
with many unrealistic scenarios.  This is a knowledgebase, so the user always has the option to 
include multi-failures they deem credible or have experienced in the past.   
Proposed Framework 
With the case study concluded and an analysis of the applicable elements performed, a proposed 
framework will be summarized.  This updates the preliminary version and incorporates 
additional detail gathered during the study process. 
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• Scope the system 
o Determine the extent of the system to be augmented 
o Identify existing AD/FI capabilities 
 Avoid duplication of existing techniques  
 Rule out subsystem inclusion or failure types if already supplemented 
• Generate Requirements 
o Include both cost and functional related requirements 
o Generate initial requirements at a higher level 
 Do not want to restrict initial AD/FI classes to consider 
• Identify/categorize sensors 
• Identify/categorize fault modes 
o Initially done at the component level, and then applied generically to like 
components 
• Research available AD/FI technologies 
o Consider: 
 Commercially available applications 
 Mature development (algorithm(s) constructed and tested) 
 Conceptual techniques with supporting test results from multiple origins  
o Categorized technologies into classes with common underlying methodologies 
• Down select to an AD and FI class that best meets requirements 
• Model the system 
o For existing systems, model elements of system that will support AD/FI testing 
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• Model the AD/FI techniques 
o If testing proves application is unacceptable, consider next AD or FI class    
• Perform trade studies of available options within the class 
o Can include existing applications or new development 
• Make recommendation 
Some of these tasks outlined above may also be performed in parallel.  The process flow diagram 
has also been updated to reflect the proposed framework (reference Figure 37 - Proposed ADFI 
Selection Framework).  The following highlights the changes to the final version: 
• Generating requirements was added as its own step prior to identifying sensors and fault 
modes 
o This task was originally embedded within the Identify AD/FI applications block 
o Knowing the requirements may provide insight as whether listing all sensors 
and/or fault modes is required 
• Down-select to AD and FI classes was added following steps to gather system and 
AD/FI information. 
o As the research uncovered numerous potential methods, a means to limit the 
modeling and testing was a required intermediate step 
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bdd [package] ADFI_Apps [ADFI_SelectionFramework]     
«block»
Scope_System
«block»
Generate_Requirements
Determine extent of the system under study
Identify existing AD/FI capabilities
Rule out subsystems with augmented AD/FI
«block»
Identify_Categorize_Sensors
«block»
Identify_Categorize_Fault_Modes
«block»
Research_ADFI_Technologies
«block»
DownSelect_ADFI_Class
«block»
Model_System
«block»
Model_ADFI_Techniques
«block»
Perform_Trade_Studies
«block»
Make_Recommendation
Include both cost and functional related requirements
Generate initial requirements at a higher level
   Do not want to restrict initial AD/FI classes to consider
Categorized technologies 
into classes with common 
underlying methodologies
For existing systems, model 
elements of system that will 
support AD/FI testing
Can include existing applications 
or new development
Initially done at the component level, and 
then applied generically to like 
components
Fails
Figure 37 - Proposed ADFI Selection Framework 
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Framework Validation 
To validate the framework, this process will be implemented on the liquid oxygen (LOX) system 
that supported ET loadings for launch.  This system is also planned to be used with the next-
generation of NASA rockets.   Liquid oxygen is also a cryogenic fluid and provides the oxidizer 
used by the Shuttle’s main engines.   
 
The various KSC systems that operate out of the control room share the same C&C architecture, 
and subsequently, there is commonality as to how the existing AD and FI capabilities currently 
function.  Therefore, many of the framework processes implemented during the case study are 
also applicable to these other varied systems.  A system engineering best practice is to reuse any 
applicable artifacts as this both reduces effort by not recreating them and keeps the content 
consistent when used across a spectrum of disciplines.  When possible,     
 
The LOX system loading operations also take place late in the launch countdown.  They are both 
hazardous and time-critical, so this system could also benefit from AD/FI augmentation.  As 
LOX is much heavier than LH2, one of the main differences between these two systems is LOX 
requires the use of large cryogenic pumps (primary and secondary) to load the vehicle.  LH2 is 
loaded by pressure only, so lacks any comparable hardware.  Therefore, the scope for this effort 
will encompass the LOX pump subsystem. 
 
The C&C subsystem has its own health and status capabilities, so this will be excluded from 
consideration.  If a leak occurs, LOX does not pose the same threat as LH2, so it does not have a 
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supporting leak and fire subsystem.  As cryogenic fluids produce large vapor clouds when 
exposed to ambient temperatures, the pad camera system will be used to identify leaks.  Limit 
setting is the primary method of AD for this system. 
 
With the scope defined, the requirements can be generated.  The requirements developed for 
LH2 were reviewed, and as these are generally high-level (and not system specific), they were 
found to be applicable to LOX.  Subsequently, the research and ranking of the AD and FI 
applications is also applicable.  The LOX sensor and fault modes will be needed for the FI 
application, so they are added to the SysML model.  Some of the LOX components within the 
pump subsystem are of the same type as LH2, so the generic fault modes for these items can be 
ported over to the LOX model. 
 
As the down-select classes are suitable for the LOX system, the K-Means method will be used 
for AD.  Training data was pulled from the STS-134 mission during the Replenish loading phase.  
Replenish operations follow the initial tank loading, and keep the ET liquid level at flight mass 
to compensate for the boil-off of cryogen fluids.  It is during Replenish when the astronauts can 
board the Shuttle, and this phase can last 4 to 10 hours.  Four measurements related to pump 
performance include thrust bearing temperature, bearing oil temperature, current applied to the 
variable frequency drive and pump outlet flow (GPM).  The data is plotted over an approximate 
4-hour window, and no obvious anomalies are observed (reference Figure 38 - STS-134 LOX 
Pump - Replenish). 
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During Replenish operations for STS-135, a leak occurred on the pump after approximately three 
hours of Replenish.  It started slowly, and very gradually worsened (reference Figure 39 - STS-
135 LOX Pump – Replenish (k-distance)).  After nearly an hour, the pump was secured and the 
secondary pump brought online to support a successful launch.  The STS-135 pump plot includes 
the corresponding k-distance plot.  Even with a couple of noisy indicators, the k-distance forms a 
stable baseline.  When the pump temperatures start to drop, the upward deflection on k-distance 
is quite apparent signaling an off-nominal trend.         
 
Figure 38 - STS-134 LOX Pump - Replenish 
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For a leak failure, camera views are the primary method for both detection and isolation.  Cold 
vapors are the norm in the storage area as there are uninsulated pipes (in addition to the pumps) 
that experience cryogenic temperatures.  When a leak occurs, these vapors will tend to envelop 
Figure 39 - STS-135 LOX Pump – Replenish (k-distance) 
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the area of origin which is an indicator for the operator.  Leaks can occur anywhere in the 
cryogenic systems, though fastened joints are the primary source.  Rarely are temperature 
sensors ideally located to capture external leaks, so having these measurements corroborate a 
leak is unique.  These indicators are installed to monitor the pump’s bearings in which the failure 
mode is high temperature.  The two LOX pumps are swapped operationally with each loading so 
they are both exposed to run time.  The secondary pump’s thrust bearing temp typically 
approaches its limit when the loads are at their highest (Fast Fill), and the pump speed is reduced 
slightly so it stays within specification (temperature and operator actions create entirely different 
pump profiles which must be considered when selecting training data).     
 
For the FI knowledgebase, perhaps only the high limit was considered a valid failure mode for 
these indicators.  This could then be remedied by simply adding the low value faults.  A model 
update would be more complicated requiring one with adequate skills to accomplish the task.  If 
the model is configuration controlled, then there are additional reviews and approvals required.  
This highlights how an internal knowledgebase provides more flexibility in being sustained.  If it 
is adequately providing FI capabilities, then this ease of maintenance should be a factor involved 
if a decision to choose an FI model is needed.      
 
The framework provided a process that was used to select AD/FI applications for the LOX 
system.  The hardware was scoped to the pump subsystem as there are no pumps on the LH2 
system that was used in the case study.  However, when possible, actions accomplished during 
the case study that were applicable to the LOX system were not repeated if the results were not 
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expected to change.  This was primarily related to requirements generation.  Although the 
hardware differed significantly, the existing AD/FI capabilities were common (as they are to 
most systems in the launch control room).  This validates the decision to go forward with K-
Means AD (via the IMS application) and generating an internal knowledgebase to incorporate FI 
capabilities, and therefore, the AD/FI selection framework.  It is noted that K-Means could 
potentially have issues related to real-time operations.  However, as these issues are understood, 
they can also be overcome with methods to control the training data utilized combined with the 
flexibility IMS provides in tuning the model.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
This research proposes a framework to be used by organizations with a need to enhance system 
anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities.  This chapter will summarize the effort, 
highlight resulting contributions, describe a limitation encountered and recommend future work 
to further expand this subject matter. 
Summary 
Chapter 1 introduces a need to improve upon existing anomaly detection and fault isolation 
capabilities for critical systems.  It points out that there are other methods available, but the 
applications selected for implementation do not always provide the anticipated benefit.  A 
problem statement is formulated and potential research objectives defined.  
 
Chapter 2 performs a literature review and confirms many new AD/FI techniques have been 
reported.  The review also focuses on systems engineering approaches to select and implement 
this technology.  Minimal research was uncovered that addresses the implementation of these 
new AD/FI technologies.  Furthermore, literature describing current systems engineering 
practices did not deal with inclusion of AD/FI technologies.  A gap analysis is performed 
indicating additional research is warranted. 
 
 Chapter 3 organizes and defines the methodology that will be used for this research project.  It 
depicts the development of an initial framework followed by a case study for time-critical, 
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highly-hazardous system.  The resulting (finalized) framework would be validated and the 
research effort summarized. 
 
Chapter 4 produces an initial framework to provide guidance on AD/FI selection incorporating 
system engineering practices.  It settles on a model-based system engineering approach and 
selects SysML as the standard to support the MBSE modeling.  It describes a detailed process 
flow for identifying requirements, the system under consideration, and the AD/FI technologies 
candidates.  Determining if requirements can be satisfied drives modeling of the techniques for 
testing.  Most of the system modeling can be accomplished within the SysML tool.  Testing the 
candidate applications required functionality beyond SysML capabilities.  The framework 
process ends with an evaluation of the applications followed by a recommendation.     
 
Chapter 5 conducts the case study with a focus on the liquid hydrogen system at KSC.  Liquid 
hydrogen is used to fuel the Space Shuttle’s main engines (as well as the next generation NASA 
rockets).  These are highly-hazardous and time-critical operations executed from a remotely 
located control room.  Thus supplemental AD/FI technologies could be valuable additions.  This 
study follows the initial framework while scrutinizing the individual steps in an effort to enhance 
the process steps.  As modeling the new technologies proves time consuming (many lack 
adequate detail and/or contain proprietary information), an intermediate step was added to the 
process flow to down-select to a classes of common techniques.  The modeling effort, and 
subsequent testing, then focuses on those methods.  For this case study, the choice came down to 
a single application (both AD and FI), or internal development.  A recommendation is made to 
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go forward with an AD application, and internally develop a means to provide fault mapping to 
accommodate the FI requirements. 
 
Chapter 6 analyzes both the framework methodology leading to the selection process and the 
chosen applications ability to meet the system requirements.  The proposed framework 
incorporates the refinements noted during the case study and those generated from the analysis to 
establish a ‘finalized’ product.  This framework is then validated against the liquid oxygen 
system also located at KSC.  The AD application successfully signaled a downward trend in two 
indicators used to monitor pump bearing performance.  The failure mode was attributed to a 
failed seal resulting in a liquid oxygen leak at the pump.  The AD plotted (k-distance) value had 
flagged the off-nominal trend well before an alarm was triggered.      
 
Chapter 7 concludes the research effort by summarizing the overall project.  It also describes the 
research contributions realized, limitations encountered during the study, and a recommendation 
for future work to continue the study of related topics.      
Framework 
The detection/isolation technologies described herein go above what is readily available, or 
currently implemented, in industry (and providing adequate coverage).  Therefore, the customer 
for this technology will have critical need(s) to offset the costs and/or effort.  These can include 
systems that are: (a) large, complex, costly; (b) highly-hazardous; (c) time-critical; (d) remote 
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operated (e) expensive when idle.  The framework developed recognizes this customer profile, as 
well as the necessity to provide a value-added result.  Advantages realized by this framework: 
• It adheres to systems engineering practices. 
o Organizations with systems requiring such applications are likely practicing 
system engineering, so will be consistent with their current policies. 
• Uses MBSE methodology implemented with SysML 
o Organizations using same methods may already have much of their systems 
adequately modeled 
• Selection process is requirements driven 
o If it cannot be determined that technologies under consideration fully meet 
requirements, drives additional modeling/testing to test capabilities 
o Validates the model prior to making recommendations 
• Objective process, so minimizes impact from biased stakeholders 
Contributions 
This dissertation is the first attempt to develop a framework with strict adherence to system 
engineering practices to improve and optimize system fault detection and isolation. The primary 
contribution is the framework itself as it provides a novel strategy to implementing new 
technology that can enhance system performance. It lays out a systematic approach to assist 
users in generating anomaly detection and fault isolation schema supporting existing or new 
designs. This directly addresses the original problem statement that initiated this research project.  
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Additional contributions include: 
• Extending SysML to include generic component failures.  This data was combined with 
existing Internal Block Diagrams components to auto-generate a fault tree (proof-of-
concept demonstrated).   
• Extend the contributions of those developing AD/FI technologies by providing a means 
to organize the detectors/isolators for consideration, and subsequently, acceptance for 
implementation should the capabilities meet the desired requirements 
• Couple AD and/or FI with unique applications for which they were never intended.  Path 
to generating AD/FI classes may uncover needs that could benefit from the underlying 
detection/isolation techniques 
• Improve accuracy in anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities by pairing those 
deemed optimal for the given environment in which they will operate 
Limitations 
A limitation encountered was that the systems under study, for the most part, shared the same 
requirements.  These two systems were identified early in this project (LH2 and LOX), and the 
actual hardware selected for modeling/testing was (purposely) dissimilar.  However, as the 
command and control system is common among all the systems operating out of the control 
room, the requirements did not change enough to drive the down-select to another class of AD or 
FI candidates.  Ultimately, the model testing did show the selected classes were effective for 
both systems, even with the disparity in hardware tested.  On the flip-side, the LH2/LOX testing 
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may be a test-case indicating these applications can be implemented for all systems operating out 
of the control room. 
Future Work 
The ability to automatically create an initial fault tree from a SysML IBD was illustrated.  This 
relied on exporting a relationship matrix linking the IBD components to fault modes added to the 
SysML.  The next logical step is to create new ‘stereotypes’ of the applicable model elements 
(further extension of the model) that can capture multiple component layering within an IBD.  
This information can then be passed to external applications via the SysML export standard (vs. 
a 2-dimensional matrix) for auto-generation use. 
 
The construction of a system fault map was identified as being a comprehensive task.  If SysML 
is extended to assign faults to components (as per the fault tree example above), then it can be 
further extended to associate indicator responses to a given component/fault combination.  This 
too can be exported to an application for auto-generation of system fault maps. 
 
The K-Means method of anomaly detection requires ingestion of training data where the user 
determines the sensitivity level in which the clusters are generated.  It also allows for adjusting 
the sensitivity of the individual elements within a vector.  Additional research should be pursued 
to include: 
• Optimization of cluster sizing  
o To include high sensitivity for post-test reviews 
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o To include low sensitivity for real-time operations 
• Optimization of individual test parameter settings 
• Optimization for threshold (alarm) setting 
• Testing for biases between datasets 
• Testing for anomalies within the (unsupervised) training data 
• Testing (and handling) of very narrow high/low ranges for data that will be 
normalized.  
 
With limited data streams and display space to monitor the system, research that can integrate 
AD/FI technologies into a single application would provide value.  With two applications 
running standalone, they are not going to be designed to communicate with one-another.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that either will be directly tied into the C&C network.  An integrated 
application can react to its self-generated alarms driving it to fetch the corresponding faults. 
 
Further testing of the framework outside of a space operations environment.  This addresses the 
‘narrow-testing’ limitation identified earlier, and would provide further confidence that this 
framework is appropriate for broad-industry use. 
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